The evolution of Islamic politics in Turkey along the NSP-PP line : change or continuity by Yıldız, Ahmet
^  4 ¿ ¡ ^ ·^  ^  'r,¿ ^  'j  'J ^ -j^ Ğ ^^  ■*‘‘^ kiS -»ií ·J^^ i^'ı.■^^  ^li n i/ ¿ N^'i¿i*5 vlf -¿ t í ^
' ^ w  Ѵ4» Ъ4ѵ W дюйЗ ΊΗ
■J*  ^ : І  ^ Ci:· ώ } . ώ
Ч W« «vW vrf‘ J  · ^
’;:a ο'·> ■■•■4
•w -J*· /кІ&Ь,
THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC POLITICS 
IN TURKEY ALONG THE NSP-PP LINE: 
CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?
A Thesis
Submitted to the Department of 
Political Science 
and
Public Administration 
of
Bllkent University
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
by
Ahmet Yıldız
September 1991
:::zÂ
А еоЭ
ı  i r n v . · '•o, 1 .; i. ijU
I certify that I have read tliis thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.
Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adecjuate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.
Dr. Faruk Genckava
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully 
adeciuate, in scope and in cjuality, as a thesis for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.
Dr. Muberra Yuk.sbl
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present study is to describe changes and continuities in the Na­
tional Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, NSP)-Prosperity Party (Refah Partisi, PP) 
line in the period through 1970 to 1990 at the level of ideological posture, political dis­
course and electoral support báse.
In doing this, I tried to emphasize,— talcing the great political and economic changes 
'Furkish society experienced in the 1980 decade and the way these changes were reflected 
in and accommodated by the NSP-PP line as the starting point,— that since the NSP-PP 
line has based itself on cultural cleavages,— mainly religious-based,— obtaining within 
Turkish society, its ideological posture in its essentials has remained outside the ,scope of 
changes resulted from functional (economic) cleavages, although the sources of its politi­
cal appeal as well as its political discourse have undergone contextual accomodations.
ÖZET
Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’deki İslâmî Hareket’in Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)- 
Refah Partisi (RP) çizgisi etrafında cisimleşen oluşumunun 1970’ten 1990’a uzanan 
zaman kesiti içinde yaşadığı değişim ve sürekliliği ideoloji, söylem ve siyasî destek tabanı 
açısından incelemektir.
Bunu yaparken, 1980 sonrasında Türkiye’de siyaset hayatının ve ekonomik 
düzenin yaşadığı köklü dönüşümün ve bunun toplumsal yansımalarının RP’nin ideolojik 
konumunu ve programını etkileyiş şeklini temel iılarak, Türkiye toplumundaki kültürel 
bölünmelere,— esas olarak dine, göre tavır alan seçmen tabanının oluşturduğu kesime 
seslenen MSP-RP çizgisinin fonksiyonel (ekonomik) bölünm elerin dikte ettiği 
değişim lerden ancak bağlamsal düzeyde etkilendiğini, ideolojik yönelim inin bu 
değişimlerin kapsamı dışında kaldığını ortaya koymaj'a çalıştım.
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INTRODUCTION
Great changes have occiired in the socio-economic conditions and cultural as well 
as political life of Turkey throughout the 1980s. While state-society relations have under­
gone an authoritarian resructurization in line with the view that “Turkey’s recent political 
ills are not those of repression, but of excess of expression”^'^ the transition to an out­
ward-oriented growth strategy with an heavy emphasis on the “self-help” ideology of the 
classical liberalisni has transformed the traditional social fabric such that economic issues 
were entrenched on top of the agenda of the “man in the street”. As a counter-reaction to 
the pre-1980 hyperpolitici.sation of society, the rhetoric of law and order, on the other 
hand, has dominated the political scene and proved to be quite influential in the de­
politicisation of the mas.ses.
Another very important development in this decade was the implementation of the 
official Islamization policies in order to take the activism of the Islamic movement under 
state control. The challenge of the increasing visibility of Islam at every level of individual 
and social existence was met with the “diluted” and “secularized” Islam of the .state. In 
this context, the ruling Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, MP), which incorporated 
many ex-members of the defunct National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, NSP), 
including the prime minister Turgut Özal himself, successfully coopted the cadres and the 
clienteles of the NSP.
Against this background, the socio-political stand of the Prosperity Party (Refah 
Partisi, PP), the apparent heir to die NSP, may have been influenced from the above- 
mentioned developments. At least, the characteristic features of its political appeal may 
have assumed a new colouration. In a political atmo.sphere in which the most rigid and or­
thodox ideological parties of the Marxist left in Turkey have exprienced drastic tranfomia- 
tions,— the 'rurkish United Communist Party is a ca.se in point, the Islamic politics of the 
NSP-PP line, too, might feel the need to adopt itself to the new socio-political setting of 
the 1980s. As one of the leading figures of the PP ob.served:
“To be .sure. (lie prc.scn( .society is cliffereiil froin dial of (lie past. Tlie world has entered a 
new era of (eclinology... If dial is (he ca.se, (hen (he pre,sen(-day parties, (oo, must be differ-
cni from (Iiosc of (he past. For (lie party is an organizalion created liy (hose people who 
commit themselves to the provision of all social needs. It is not po.ssible for the Prosperity 
Party, to be a replica of the past parties... Yet, we can not isolate ourselves from (he past, 
cither."^ ^^
Thus, to trace tlie evolution of tlie NSP-PP line in terms of tiie unfolding of its ide­
ological posture as well as its political cadres and electoral base may show the extent to 
which the socio-economic changes have been reflected and internalized by it. The present 
thesis will dwell on the assertion that since the NSP-PP line is basically a political reflec­
tion of the cultural cleavages centered around the elite-mass dichotomy in Turkish society, 
a primary restructurization along the functional cleavages is not possible for it as long as 
the cultural ones endure. Yet, the functional cleavages, too, have been incoiporated into 
the political discourse of the NSP-PP line as far as they are in consonant with its ideologi­
cal orientation.
In the political literature concerned, tlie various aspects of the NSP has been analy- 
sized by a number of the students of Turkish politics. Some of the questions dealt within 
the context of the NSP in these studies were: 1) What is the role of religion in the political 
behaviour of the Turkish electorate? Does the religious appeal by itself is enough for a po­
litical party to survive the electoral competition?^·^^; 2) Is a political party aiming at the es­
tablishment of an Islamic state incompatible with democratic practices? Was the NSP a 
threat to Turkish democracy? Can an Islamic Party such as the NSP create serious prob­
lems for Turkish democracy in the future? '^'^; 3) The NSP is both for industrialization and 
traditional Islamic values. To what extent are these two aims compatible with each other?
Yet, none specifically has dealt with the question of politieal change in terms of Islam­
ic politics of the NSP-PP line. How is political change understood in the Islamic context? 
How did the PP react to the above-mentioned post-1980 developments in Turkish poli­
tics, mainly the authoritarian reconstruction of state-society relations, transition to free 
market economy and the implclnentation of official Islamisation policies. In view of the 
PP’s stance toward these developments, can one .say that it is an exact replica of the NSP 
or not? If so, why? If not, why not? Thus, this study aims at forging an overall political 
landscape of Islamic politics organized at the level of political party in Turkey, with spe­
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cial reference to the commonalities and differences in the NSP-PP line regarding its ideo­
logical posture, party programme, political discourse and electoral support base.
7'he first chapter deals with the making of Islamic politics in post-1980 Turkey, 
which was, to an important extent, characterized by the main parameters upon which the 
NSP-PP line has evolved. In this context, the major characteristics of the post-1980 Is­
lamic movement, its sources and power base alongside the prospects for “political Islam” 
in Turkey were searched.
The second chapter dwells upon the interaction between the NSP-PP line and the 
other conservative and radical Islamic formations. Specifically, it focuses on the evolution 
of the political competition between the NSP-PP line and the center-right parties,—^Justice 
Party of the 1970s and the Motherland Party of the 1980s, respectively, the impact of the 
rise of the “revolutionary” Islam on the relatively moderate stand of the NSP-PP line and 
its increasing Islamic universalism.
The last chapter tackles the ideological stand of the NSP-PP line called the “Nation­
al Outlook”. While focusing on this it, at the same time, compares the electoral perfor­
mance of the NSP and the PP. But, since the PP has not managed to enter the National 
Assembly yet, the governmental performance of the NSP-PP line remains outside the 
scope of this study.
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(6) The terms “political” or “radical” Islam u.sed throughout the thesis denote only a dif­
ference in the degree of Islamic consciousness among Muslims. Otherwise, the view 
espoused in this thesis regarding the use of these labels is in agreement with the fol­
lowing obseiwation: “The terms fundamentalist or radical used by orientalists to isolate 
the groups aiming to establish an Islamic way of life with an all-inclusive socio­
political system, from the ordinary Muslim population can not explain the increasing 
Islamic response to the Western way of thought and life”. See Ahmed Davudoğlu, The 
Impacts o f Alternative Weltanschauungs on Political Theories: A Comparison of 
Tawhid and Ontological Proximity Unp. Ph.D. Dissertation (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Uni­
versity, 1990), p. 2. In line with this observation, the term “ Islamic reassertion” was 
used in this study to refer to the phenomenon of the “increasing visibility of Islam” in­
stead of “Islamic resurgence” or “Islamic revival”.
"It is strongly possible that not in a too distant future, 
Islam would become the only ideal, the only ideology 
of our people. Ataturkism, laicism, and nationalism 
would possibly become ineffective against Islamic acti­
vism and the ideologies dominating the current parties 
would vanish under the pressure of the Islamic ideo­
logy."
—Talat S. Halman 
Milliyet, June 22,1987.
1.THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC POLITICS IN POST-1980 TURKEY
In orcler to have a fuller grasp of the commonalities and the differences between the 
Islamic politics of the defunct NSP of the 1970s and the apparent heir to it, the PP of the 
1980s, their sources of appeal, their power base and tlieir successess and failures, one 
need to trace the evolution of the Turkish political system, particularly in the last two dec­
ades that witnessed the emergence of political Islam in the form of a political party strictly 
operating within the legal-secular framework of the party politics. Such an historical ap­
proach would shed some lights on the continuties in the NSP-PP line and at the same time 
show to what extent its ideological posture and social programme have reflected the so­
cio-political, cultural and economic changes Turkish society underwent throughout those 
years. With this purpose in mind, let us now briefly sketch the political and ideological 
environment within which Turkey found itself in the last decades, starting first with the 
post-1980 era, which was characterized by the ri.se of Islam in politics not only in Tur­
key, but also all over the Muslim world.
A. Growing Influence of Islam
The agenda of Turkish politics in the 1980s was partially characterized by increa­
sing manifestations of radical IslanV'^ in almost every levels of society: from the newly- 
born Muslim bourgeoisie comprising mostly lower and middle level traders and industri-
ali.sts and intelligentsia to tlie bureaucracy and mass media apart from the increasing ob­
servance of Quranic injuctions at the personal level. In a way, like in the 1950s, Turkey 
witnessed the return of Islam, “the invisible cloth worn by people”^ \^ once again, but this 
time with a “novel and original challenge”^ \^ presenting itself as an alternative system to 
the secular ideologies of both the left and the right, which clearly reflected the changing 
balance of political forces and ideologies, the most important of which being the exhaus­
tion of the state-spon.sored Kemalism^'’^ . Atatiirk’s vision of modern science performing 
the function of a “civic religion” and of .secular nationalism ba.sed on ethnic and linguistic 
loyalties could not be a substitute for Islam. As Mardin obseiwed:
“The iiiabilily of Alaluik’.s cducalional icfonii lo reach (he rural ma.s,se.s left a blank in their 
understanding of stxial reality, which became critical as .social change mobilized liugc num­
bers of them. Kemalism neither had an extensive explanation of how social justice was to 
lx; achieved nor did it provide a more general ethical underpinning o f .society by drawing its 
.social principles out ol a credible ideology. The republic created this ethical vacuum in a so­
ciety where religious and ethical commands had been important. The inability of Kemalism 
lo provide a social ethos that appealed to the heart as well as to the mind was more diso­
rienting than would appear at first sight” '^’f
The substitution of secular nationalism for Islam led to the dislocation of traditional 
code of behaviour providing individuals with a “map of world” in which they knew how 
to behave or what to do in various instances of their everyday life., e.g., in ca.ses of birth, 
death, marriage and the like. This state of affairs created an ethical vacuum which was 
filled in by folk Islam in the countryside while leading to the “cri.ses of culture” among the 
educated^'’^  Being aware of this ethical vacuum prevailing in the conduct of the personal 
behaviour, the ruling Kemalist militaiy junta of the 1980-1983 period made extensive use 
of Islamic symbolism with the purpose of showing how much modern, open to progress 
Islam was. Thus the leader of the junta,— later the president of 7’urkey (1982-1989), Ke­
nan Evren, at times cited verses from the Quran so as to justify the points he made when 
he adressed people with the intention of making Islam functional in the integration as well 
as modernization of society without compromising his secular stance^^\ To asses tlie mili­
tary’s stance toward Islam—which would be taken up in more details later on, in the con­
- 6 -
text of the pre.sent strength of radical Islam, it is important to outline some of the major 
achievements of political Islam in the social and political life of Turkey in the 1980s.
During the last decade, radical^ **^  Islamic activities in Turkey have disccrnibly in­
creased in political, social, economic and intellectual spheres. The observance of Islamic 
practices such as mosque attendance and participation in the pilgrimage to Mecca in­
creased to the extent that Turkey ranked third in 1982 in the number of pilgrims^^l Like- 
wi.se, it can safely be obsei-ved that fasting during Ramadan has become more widespread 
than before. Despite the official ban dating back to the early years of the Republic on their 
existence, the membership and organizational activities of sufi orders and religious 
groups expanded, and thanks to their increasing publicity in recent years, gained a some­
what precarious status of de facto .semi-legality. The circulation of Islamic literature, dif- 
feient in content and more in number than before as well as the dissemination of Islamie 
views through the products of modern technology, such as audio-visual cas.settes— a 
radical departure from face-to-face communication within tarikat organizations, has in- 
crea.sed. Also, noteworthy that while the number of religious publications increased by 
more than two times in the years between 1978-1987, the number of philosophical publi­
cations, decreased by half^''’\  It seems, as if the secular versus religious duality of Tanzi­
mat era in education has made a comeback. Thus one can suggest that a paralel and alter­
native network of political socialization has been formed through the unofficial as well as 
the official centers of Islamic education, the prime examples of which being Imam-Hatip 
Schools (Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools) and Quran schools scattered all over Tur­
key, alongside the introduction of compulsory religious courses in primaiy and secondary 
schools thanks to the article 24 of the new Constitution of 1982^"l The prohibition of the 
wearing of head.scarf by female Muslim students, who consider tesettür (religious wear­
ing) to be an absolute and definite command of God in the Quran to the believers, en­
dured during the decade and led to a .small-scale political crisis in 1989 following mass 
demonstrations protesting the annulment of the bill by the Constitutional Court rendering 
the wearing of headscarf legal in the universities on the ground that it represented a politi­
cal symbol challenging the .secular foundations of the state and therefore breaking the 
public order. The crisis situation caused rumours about the possibility of a new military
coup in the secular press. To be sure, the whole event clearly revealed the activism of the 
Islamic opposition in Turkey^'^l
Besides the social and cultural manifestations of the Islamic reas.sertion, there has 
been increasing visibility of Islam in the political and economic life of Turkey. The pri­
mary form o f Islamic activism in politics appeared to be the “infiltration” efforts of vari­
ous Islamic groups in state institutions. As it became evident, the Islamists have held im­
portant positions of power especially in the Ministry of National Education and the 
Ministry of InterioT'^l In the intrusion of Islamic groups to the bureaucracy, the NSP’s 
participation in government as a minor but important coalition partner between 1974-1978 
had a prime role. The ministries at the di.spo.sal of the NSP were filled with the sympa­
thizers of the party. In the 1980s, the same phenomenon continued under the auspices of 
the I.slamic faction within the ruling MP^'‘*\ As a result of the.se developments, today 
there is a wide network of pro-Islamists in the bureaucracy, a phenomenon largely re­
sponsible for the fragmentation and pluralization of the old political center and hence, to 
some extent, erosion of the power ba.se of the bureaucratic elitism. The only exception to 
this pattern, however, is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The obi^eiwance of strict admis­
sion conditions as well as the fact that it has never been under the di.spo.sal of a religious­
ly-minded person largely account for the endurance of that situation.
Another indication of the growing influence of Islam in the post-1980 Turkish poli­
tics was the composition of the governments of Turgut Özal. For the first time in the 
Turkish parliament a party in which Islamists well-repre.sented has remained in power 
without interruption since 1983. Headed by Mehmet Keçeciler, the pre-1980 mayor of 
Konya province under the ticket of the NSP, Islamists obtained a majority in the Central 
Administrative Body of the MP in the General Congre.ss of 1988, despite the opposition 
of the then prime minister, Turgut Özal. The I.slamic faction within the MP carried out 
pro-Islamic practices in many fields. For instance, the theory of Creation was put in the 
curriculum of biology cour.ses in secondary and high schools as the alternative explana­
tion to Darwin’s theory of natural .selection regarding the evolution of human species. The 
prohibition of beer advertisements on state radio and television was another example^·'’). 
The previous center-right parties, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) and the Jus-
— 8 —
tice Party (Adalet Partisi, JP) respectively, incorporated Islamists within their ranks as 
well. But the overall power of the Islamic faction within the governing MP is much larger 
than that within the ranks of the defunct DP and JP.
The emergence of a new and dynamic sector in the 7'urkish economy, part of which 
held by Islamists was still another important element in the so-called “Islamic reassertion” 
of the 1980s. Benefitting from economic liberalization policies and taking advantage of 
having close connections with the ruling MP governments, the growing Islamic sector in 
the economy found its real embodiment in the emergence of a Muslim Anatolian bour­
geoisie well-represented in the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Stock Exchange, a 
very influential body of the Turkish private sector rival to the powerful Turkish Industri­
alists and Businesmen’s Association (TUSİ AD) as well as in the establishment of interest- 
free banking after Özal came to power in 1983. It is estimated that the Islamic banks in Tur­
key would collect a tenth of the all-domestic deposits until 1993 '^^^
For a country that has gone through a period of “religious sterility”d^ > during its na­
tion-building phase and become the most westernized society in the Muslim world politi­
cally as well as culluralwise, the incerasing manifestations of Islam as a religio-political 
movement point to a remarkable change^"*\ Never having taken the form of a political 
ideology in the hands of opposition groups during the Ottoman-Turkish history, increas­
ing visibility of Islam in the Turkish political life today represents “the victory of obscu­
rantism over science” in the eyes of the Kemalist secularists who tend “ to interpret any 
display of religiousness as an example of obscurantist advance” '^‘-'\ To be sure, for ounni 
Muslims, the rise of political Islam is “a means of establishing social control over the 
c o m m u n i t y A t  this point, however, without going into the details of various concep­
tions of the Islamic reassertion by different segments of society, one need better to appre­
ciate “ the challenge of radical Islam” in terms of its organizational patterns.
B. Organizational Patterns of Political Islam
Islamist forces in contemporary Turkey express themselves in a variety of ways. 
Among these are Islamist parties, sufT orders, economic organizations, the insitutions of
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Islamic organizations and the publication industry. Political Islam,
however, is organized primarily on two levels alongside the political party formation, 
which found its main expression in the “National Outlook” of the NSP-PP line: 1) The 
level of tarikat which dates back to the early Ottoman times; 2) the level of an independent 
radical movement critical of party politics as well as both the tradition of the sunni Islam 
and the practices of folk Islam characterized by different interpretations of various orders, 
not to mention the state-controlled Islam of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs at­
tached to the office of the Prime Minister^^'l
Leaving aside the expression of organized Islam at the level of political party for the 
moment, it would be apropriate to examine the place of folk Islam and its most important 
expressions, sufi orders, within the Islamic movement in post-1980 Turkey. Its contours 
being determined not by ulema, but by tarikaMcaders, i.e, seikhs, the folk Islam— as a 
popular interpretation of Islam, has been the prime mover behind the recent rise of Islam. 
In the Ottoman period, compared to the orthodox and pro-state Islam of the Ulema at the 
center, sufi orders— the most important and long-lasting expressions of the folk Islam, 
wei'e locally-based, extremely diverse and at times, outside the mainstream of the classical 
Islam at the periphery. This was resulted from the abstract and authtentic nature of Sunni 
Islam which did not allow the emergence of an environment conducive for the perpetua­
tion of the old beliefs and customs under an Islamic disguise of nomadic tribes that newly 
converted into Islam. This was also true for Turkish tribes who had deeply-rooted and 
long-lasting Shamanistic traditions. This state of affairs led to the adoption of the sufi 
form of Islam which was characterized by the personal interpretations and hence apt to the 
continution of the pre-Islamic beliefs and habits especially among the segments of those 
tribes who established themselves in the countryside. To cite an example, the personality 
cult formed around the ruler among the Shamanist Turks found a proper ground to flour­
ish in the hierarchical structure of sufi orders based on the spiritual influence of sheiks. In 
other words, unlike sunni Islam of the cities, sufism formed the most important appear­
ance of Islam at the popular level in the countryside. Yet, although folk Islam was heavily 
influenced by sufi orders, it did not reflect an exact view of sufism, which, in time, 
gained a dominant sunni character in theological terms.
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During the foundation period of tlie Ottoman Empire, there emerged a struggle bet­
ween tlie sunni center and the various appearances of folk Islam. Over time, however, su- 
fism established itself in the social hierarchy of the Empire and became the most important 
intermediary structure for social mobility. Against the “excesses” of the ruling class, the 
reaya took refuge in sufi orders such that they provided a justification ground for the Ce­
lali uprisings of the late seventeeth century(^^\ The same activist line continued during the 
19th century and the second half of that century witnessed the revitalization movements in 
the Ottoman lands organized by sufî orders, sometimes assuming a political character re­
flecting the anti-imperialist feelings of the mas.ses against the western intrusion. They 
played important roles in the implementation of the pan-Islamist policies of the Sultan Ab- 
dulhamid II. It is a well-known fact that during the war of the independence (1919-1922), 
Mustafa Kemal, the then Commonder in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, established 
important connections with the leaders of some orders in order to secure their support for 
the national struggle.
After the establishment of the Republic, however, the orders were outlawed by the 
new regime on the ground that they had become the sources of superstitions and religious 
fanaticism and therefore responsible for the backwardness of the country. In fact, the more 
iniportant reason for the ban on their existence was their radical opposition to the founder of 
the Rebuplic, Atatürk, and to the radical nature of his secular reforms.
Despite the legal ban, however, the orders continued to operate in the counti7side 
and later established themselves in the cities as well. Upon transition to multi-party poli­
tics, the orders increased their political activities with some degree of publicity. They have 
made their voice heard in politics and increasingly become the “reserve force” of the cen­
ter right parties, first against the Jacobin secularism of the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Malk Partisi, RPP) and then against “the rising communist threat” facing the 
country^^-^\ They also actively participated in the formation of an independent Islamic po­
litical stand. In the establishment of the first independently organized Islamist political 
party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, NOP) and following its closing 
down by the Constitutional Court, in the N,SP, both the Nakşibendis and Nurcus were 
very active. In the last decade, not withstanding their still uncertain legal status, they ma­
naged to legitimize their existence thanks to the emergence of a nascent civil society which 
has created a inore tolerant political atmosphere.
I ’hus in that period, they have become the semi-legal component of the Islamic op­
position alongside the Islamic parties operating within the legal boundaries. The increas- 
’'^...Şctivities of the orders and Islamic groups, among which the prominent ones are 
Nakşibendis, Qadiris, Suleymancis and Nurcus, give .some clues about the extent of the 
Islamic reas.sertion in post-19801’urkey. To illustrate, it is generally speculated that many 
leading politicians and .government authorities are members of the orders. Although the 
tarikat-politician connection is well-publicized in theTurki.sh secular press, no politician 
has dared to declare openly its tarikat membership so fafG- .^ Last but not the least, orders 
and religious groups are the most important power ba.se of the Islamic movement aiming 
at changing social and political institutions in a peaceful way by “infiltrating” them^^‘’\  
'Fliis became evident especially in the case of the Turkish Armed Forces chosen as a target 
.o f prime importance for “ infiltration” effort.s^^ ’^l  In fact, in practical grounds, it seems 
that the “infiltration” functions as a two-way process. As Ruşen Çakır aptly points out, 
the strategy of infiltration is not a sheer success on the part of Islamists in that while they 
have tried to “capture” the state from within, those who infiltrated the state institutions 
were coopted by the state and have undergone a “process of rationalization” which has 
resulted in increasing individualization and the breaking or at least, the loosening of ties 
with the orders^^^l
Apart from the various orders which have cho.sen to operate within the present sys­
tem, there is a “radical”, nti 1 itanlly..antirsystemic wing pfjhe ]şl<ux!İc,n^ ^  ^ which in-
crea.sed its assertiveness particularly after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Influenced by 
the revolution, the radical wing of ,die Islai^ ^^ ^^  refuses to engage in party po-·
litics, is against “ infiltration” efforts as a means to the ultimate end becau.se it necessitates 
compromise on the side of Muslims, and views Islam as a revolutionary anti-imperiali.st 
force. Contrary to the traditionalist wing of the movement, they advocate the immediate 
establishment of an Islamic state and then to ii.se the state power in order to establish an 
Islamic society. Their strategy raiuires immediate political action rather than cultural and 
social change^^’’^  In fact, the key to the examination of the last ten years of the Islamic
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movement in Turkey, to a great extent, lies in the conflict and contradictions between the
marginal in numbers and the traditionalists 
who constitute the majority. The radicals tried to transform Islam into a revolutionary ide­
ology by dismantling its historically shaped “protective belt” of the tradition without much 
success, however. Against the radical wing organized mainly around some publication 
houses, and becoming increasingly marginal with their more or less “secular­
ized” understanding of Islam^ *^^  ^ the traditionaiists have more “moderate” ideological ten­
dencies in terms of their strategy for attaining political power. They believe that in a coun­
try like Turkey where Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority, the Islamic sharia 
should be implemented. They see the Quran and the Prophet’s sunna as the only proper 
guideline for individual and collective acts. They vehemently reject westernisation in cul­
tural life and bchayjoral patterns but ready to accept western science and technology as a 
constituent component of aiv lslamic polity^^”^
In the context of this conflict, the existence of the n^wly-bprn Muslim intellectuals 
deserves special attention. They are not the representative of the traditional Ulema, nor 
have they stuck to the orthodox formulations of the classical schools of the Islamic law. 
Singe they do not .see violence as a legitimate means, they can be considered within the 
rank-s of the traditionalists. They produce comprehensive studies reinterpreting the role of 
Islam in history, politics, economics and state. They write on highly diverse issues, rang­
ing from the discussions around the philosophy of science to the contemporary strategic 
issues between the United vStates and the USSR. These works are largely written in a 
popular and modern language and, in the last analysis, addressed to those searching for 
answers to their questions related to “the problem of the meaning”. Some Mu.s|iinJjitellec- 
tuals like ismet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören and Abdurrahman Dilipak are very 
popular and widely read in the Islamic circles^^'l
C. Major Characteristics of the Post-1980 Islamic Movement
Having outlined briefly the organizational basis of the political Islam, the imperative 
task confronting us is to delineate the major characteristics of the post-1980 Islamic
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movement. In the first place, the term “ Islamism” must be operationalized. As Ismail 
Kara observed, the concept of Islamism can be defined as follows:
“... a movemeni, beginning wi(h (he ninclcenth cenlury, embocliag llic totality of intellec­
tual and .scicntific works, .searciies, suggestions and .solutions aiming at making Islam pre­
vail in .social life in its entirety—covering faith, prayers, ethics, philo.sophy, politics, edu­
cation and .so on, once again; at preserving the Muslim world from western domination, 
despotic rulers, captivity, imitation and superstitions for (he sake of civilization, unity and 
development with an activist, modernist and eclectic s(aiid”^^ \^
Drawing upon the above conceptualization, the Islamic movement can be defined as 
the sum of all sorts of activities aiming at guiding society to live in accordance with Islam­
ic teachings. Although the Islamic movement was conceived as an opposition movement 
characterized e.specially by political actions in recent years, it, in fact, denotes an anti- 
.systemic challenge at the social and intellectual as well as political levels. On the other 
hand, because the word “movement” implies the aspect of thought that materializes at the 
behavioral level, the Islarnic movement mu.st not be understood only as a totality of ac­
tions. There is at the same time another side to it, which is the formation of the inner pro­
cess of the movement. Tlie intellectual contribution of the Islamist thinkers at the begin­
ning of this century is striking in this respect.
Given the definition above, however, a potential question to be raised at this point 
is: Does the Islamic movement in Turkey point to the existence of a broad-based move­
ment with clearly-defined centres of authority and leadership through a unified structure 
of decision-making? It is evident that the term “ Islamic movement” is not a well-defined 
construct, for it refers to a multi-dimensional fonoation including political parties, sufi or­
ders, the revolutionary radicals and “independent” Muslim intellectuals. It does not have a 
monolithic structure with a clearly-drawn hierarchy. histea,il,pX.a,.roQAQlithic..ut3jfeif^ ^^ ^^ ^
ganization acting in accordance with a .single programme, what is seen in Turkey, as 
elsewhere in the Muslim world, resembles more of a brjsyg^&fialiila''' aiming at the devel­
opment of common Islamic values and, in the final analysis, the establishment of a com­
munity of believers under an Islamic state. The movement .sees the western secular culture
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as being extremely degenerate compared to the Islamic one. Sexual permissiveness, mate­
rialism and individuali.sm of the westernized elites are considered as the syndroms of 
“westoxication”^^ -^ \ It asserts that the contemporary problems of the Turkish polity and its 
perpetual dependency to the western industrial countries are caused by the imposition of 
the strictly secular policies-^so alien to the traditional fabric of Turkish society and oppo­
site to its great historical past, a thesis central to the ‘National Outlook’ of the NSP-PP 
line.
Though the Islamists share the same aims with regard to the “final solution”, i.e., 
the establishment of an Islamic order, there is a profound disparity in their views regard­
ing the ideology and strategy of the movement to be followed. As referred to before, one 
can classify the divisions within the Islamic movement under the riij:)]^ 'ics of “traditional- 
ists” and “radicals”. While the traditionalists have espou,sed evolutionary means and are 
for the continutiation of the ‘‘classical wLsdoni’’, the radical.s have ad.opt^^ revolu­
tionary posture in instrumental terms and heavily questioned the appearances of “liistori- 
eal Isicim” carried into tlie modern world. Accordingly, the amorphous nature of the Is- 
lamie movement in Turkey further shows itself in the fact that there isjio  ,single leader 
followed by all the. factions· fn this regard, it differs from tho.se elsewhere in the Muslim 
world. It has not managed to produce the leaders having the power and status of such 
people as Hasan al-Benna and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ay­
atollah Khoimeini in Iran. Also, contrary to the Iranian ca.se, the ulema does not have a 
vanguard position within the ranks of the Islamie movement in Turkey where the promi­
nent Islamists work in “lay” professions due to the erasion of the power base of the ilmiy- 
ye class during the introduction of the secular reforms in the 1920s.
Up to the 1980s, few Turkish observers have seen the activities of the Islamist 
groups as a religio-politieal movement. The primary eharacteristics of the post-1980 Is­
lam, however is that it has been “ideologized”. “Islam as culture” extended itself to the 
political level and turned into “Islam as politics”. This is because Islam does not distin­
guish between public and private realms. It is both a normative system and a political ide­
ology. The rejeetion of the separation of the sacred and the secular is a natural corollary of 
the Islamic principle of “tawhid”. In this regard, Islam is in an alternative position to the
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political process itself^^''^ This, in turn, has given rise to the challenge of Islam as a “po­
litical ideology” alternative to “secular religions”. It came increasingly to be a revolution­
ary political movement espousing evolutionary means^-^‘'l  All in all, despite divisions the 
Islamic movement suffers from within, it has successfully established itself as an active 
political ideology in opposition*^*’^ to the fundamental tenets of the secular regime, operat­
ing within a relatively Islamized cultural environment and constituting a vigorous and dy­
namic element of the newly-emerging civil society.
D. Sources of the Post-1980 Islamic Reassertlon:“lslam Ver­
sus Islamization”
Reaction to the militant secularism of the Kemalist period reflecting itself as a new 
soul-searching by those who see Islam as a complete way of life is an important dimen­
sion of the greater visibility of Islam in Turkish politics and society since the transition to 
multi-party politics in 1946. The introduction of a multi-party system and consequent 
competition for votes led to “a kind of redi.scovery of the continuing attachment of the 
peasant majority to the traditional Islamic values and rituals”f^ k^ This redi.scovery by poli­
ticians of the strength of Islam among masses created an increasingly expanding space of 
liberty for Islamic activities and took a greater momentum especially in the 1980s. In this 
context, a question pertinent to the “achievements” of political Islam particularly in the 
1980-1990 decade, needs to be examined: what conditions in the last decade have been 
conducive to a pattern of politics imbued with kslamic colouration? Those who feel un­
easy due to the entrenchment of Islam into the agenda of Turkey in the 1980s tend to re­
late the rise of Islam to the policies pursued by the post-1980 military regime and the fol­
lowing Motherland Party governments, which made extensive use of Islam in the 
reformulation of the state ideology and hence tried to implement a controlled Islamization 
policy in the social life and political structure of the country. What this approach over­
looks, however, is that the vigor and dynamism of the Islamic movement owe more to 
societal dynamics than to the official Islamization policies. In fact, the phenomenon of the 
so-called “Islamic reas.sertion” is too complicated and multi-dimensional to be explained
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by a single variable, i.e., the official Islamization policies^^'^l Therefore, it would be more 
appropiate to see the Islamic reassertion of the 1980s as a result of both the maturation of 
the efforts and dynamisnT of acitivities of the.Islamic groups and orders at various lev­
els in the past as well as the new staiice adopted by the post-1980 military administration 
with regard to the role of religion in society.
In this context, another question is: “why has Islam as a religious and social phe­
nomenon received unprecedented recognition since 19807”^^ ^^  The post-1980 period wit­
nessed a new process of interpretation and a new phase of the relations between Islam, 
secularism and modernization on the part of the state elites. To begin with, the disappear- 
ence of the old cultural cleavage of the center and the periphery turned Kemalism into an 
anachronic entity in a society which has increasingly become urbanized and differentiated. 
As the self-perceived guardian of the state, the military administration (1980-1983) tried 
to fill the ideological vacuum created with the “exhaustion of Kemalism” '^’'7by giving up 
what Heper calls the “bureaucratized” version of Ataturkism conceived to be the source 
of all public policies. In order to put an end to what Frederick Frey described as “ the pol­
itics of the absurd”^ '" \ i.e., the lack of an integrative fabric for society, the military re­
garded Ataturkism as an Weltanschauung— i.e., an outlook, which offers a rational and 
scientific way to modernity rather than a political manifesto, as is the case with “cosmo­
gonic” ideologies, like Marxism. Thus the militant .secularism of the single party period 
(¡923-1946) was given a new context whereby it became possible to make u.se of Islam 
for developing a new pattern of normative civil ethos which would be functional in com­
manding personal loyalties and in the integration of society^'’^ ^
But this state of affairs alone can not explain the highly pragmatic attitude of the 
military regarding the role of religion in Turkish society. Islam was akso thought to be a 
bulwark against anti-status quo ideologies, particularly against the Marxist left, which 
was the main ideological threat to the state in the pre-1980 years. As an Islamist writer 
succintly observed:
“Islam was used as an aiKidolc against (lie communist tlircat. But Islam, too, was equally,
even more dangerous tlian communism in tlie eyes of the military. Hence the preemption of
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Islam was imperalivc. This task could best be done Ihiougli Islam only in the absence of ri­
val ideologies. Thus, the military administration tried to preempt Islam through şibih- 
Islam, (nominal or alleged Islam). Thai is, if they had become successful in erecting the 
şibih-Islam throughout the country, they would have preempted not only the communist but 
also the .so-called Islamic thicar '^ '^ l^
As Asaf Hii.seyin aptly observed, the preemption of political Islam by the official Is- 
lamization policies, in fact, points to a general strategy adopted by the non-lslamic re­
gimes all over the Muslim world after the Iranian Revolution of \ Through Islami-
zation policies, the secular ruling elites tried to project an Islamic image into the eyes of 
religious masses. Thus Islam has been given a pacifistic and ritualistic function. While 
emphasizing through the pacifistic aspect, the need to separate the “sacred religious feel­
ings”,— their proper place thought to be in the conscious of the individual, from politics,
i.e, the mundane issues, they reduced Islam into the performance of the five pillars of iba- 
dah by the ritualistic aspect a,scribed to it. Seemingly, the Islamization policies were sub­
stituted for the process of secularization. The primary aim intended with Islamization, 
however, was to coopt the Islamic groups into tlie system on the one hand, and to pro­
vide Islamic legitimacy to the prevailing regimes, on the other^'’·’^  Although providing Is­
lamic legitimacy to the .sytem is of great importance, especially in the Arab Middle East, 
this is not the case in Turkey owing to the political legitimacy conferred on the relatively 
well-established democratic process in the eyes of people.
What were the other factors that prompted the military to adopt such a line, then? 
True enough, the impacts of the pre-1980 environment of severe violence and teixorism 
led the military administration to the conclusion that Islam can be u.sed as the integrative 
cement of society against ideological “extremes”. At the same time, Islam was conceived 
to be the antidote of sunni radicalism and hence to lend support to the “moderated” Islam 
under government control could provide the military with an efficient and subtle way of 
counteracting the rise of political Islam. Thus, a new state ideology was created under the 
rubric of “ the Turkish-Islainic Synthesis” '^*^’). Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the secular 
Turkish Republic, was portraid as a believing-president. Religious themes were ex­
pressed through an “Ataturkist mode of presentation”. Yet there were some other func­
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tions expected to be performed by Islam, the most important of whicli, was to lower the 
expectation of the masses for better economic conditions and furnish them with an ethos 
of sacrifice against the rising economic liardships for the genera! welfare of society to be 
attained in futuref’^^  Alongside the exclusion of the popular sector from political process, 
the adaption of an outward-oriented economic growth strategy doubled the hardships 
faced by people who already had no say in the policy-making process because of the eco­
nomic stabilization measures, such as the compression of wages, the curtailment of social 
rights and the enforcement of lesser comsumption, and the like. The promotion of relig­
ion with the purpose of using it as a security valve for the authoritarian recons-truction of 
state-society relations and of the new liberal economic order, however, turned out to be a 
catalyst for the rise of the Islamic movement outside the state control, which had remained 
latent for years and now could find a ripe ground to manifest itself. Thus, it seems to be 
essential to analyse the relationship between state and religion in Turkish political life 
from an historical perspective not only to better understand the Islamic reassertion of the 
post-1980s, but also given, ihe fact Islam has always been part of the national identity and 
played different roles in different periods of tlie history.
In the Ottoman Empire, Islam played primarily a politically stabilizing roleO*). The 
political centre repre.sented Sunni Islam and derived its legitimacy from it. Though the es­
sence of legitimacy, th.e religion receded the state in importance in that the presei'vation of 
Islam is alleged to be bound to the endurance of the state, a philosophy summarized in the 
maxim “devlet ii ebed müddet”, a “state intended for eternity”. The ulema was attached to 
the ruling Askeri class who were exempted from taxing and had no independent forma­
tion vis-a-vis the state. As noted before, against the consei'vative, pro-state Islam of the 
center, the periphery’s Islam, i.e., the folk Islam had sufi leanings and was quite hetero­
dox. It \vas not state-controlled and hence functioned as the locus of the opposition from
time to time(49)
The Republic’s .secular regime saw the two arms of the organized Islam, tarikat and 
the ulema, as the biggest threat to state power and authority and accordingly, created new 
bureaucratic and constitutional restraints against the Islamic activities of both the ulema 
and tarikat. Kemalist policies against religion were in essence characterized by a strict
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State control over religion rather than the separation of the sacred and the profane and the 
exclusion of the believers from the political process, amounting to no less than a state of 
“religious sterility”. Since the Islamic forces were pushed to underground, there was no 
legal ground for the opposition. Therefore, the political reaction of Islam in this period 
showed itself in the sporadic uprisings of various orders, the most important of which 
was the sheikh Said rebellion of 1925. 7'he rebellion had religious as well as ethnic 
(Kurdish) overtones and was harshly repressed.
Following the Second World War, certain Kemalist restrictions on the expression 
of Islam was removed in line with the introduction of multi-party system. In the 1947 
General Congress of the RPP, the introduction of religion courses on valuntary basis in 
primary and secondary schools was accepted and for the conduct of the religious servic­
es, Imam-Hatip Courses were introduced in order to educate religious functionaries. 
These and the following developments along the same line in the 1950s were interpreted 
as the “revival of Islam” by the western observers of the Turkish politics at the time^ -^ ”\  In 
fact, it can safely be noted that as the democratization process got accelerated, so did the 
Islamization. Beginning with the DP period, (1950-1960) religious demands found their 
way into the political decision-making process. Despite its public commitment to secular­
ism, the popular leader of the DP and the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not show 
any hesitation in distinguishing between the reforms that has received popular acceptance 
and the reforms that could not have gained the content of the people, notably the militant 
secularism of the RPP. Thus, the call to prayer was again in Arabic. The recital of the Qu­
ran was introduced on the Turkish state radio. But, in general, there was no radical depar­
ture from the secular tenets, though the DP increasingly resorted to the use of Islamic 
symbolism in the late 1950s. Overall, during the decade, however, the religious demands 
were still not very different in content from those of the single party era. Yet, the discov­
ery of “political party” by the Islamic groups and orders proved to be instrumental in the 
achievement of “relegitimacy” "^’'^  to religion.
Turkey entered the 1960s with a newly-ratified Constitution accepted in a popular 
referendum after the 1960 militaiy coup, which delegated important powers to the bureau- 
cratic-intellectuad elites and simultaneously liberalizing the Turkish political system in a
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drastic way through the introduction of the basic rights and liberties. Thus, despite the 
mixed nature of the new Contitution, leflected in the creation of a Constitutional Court as 
well as other bureaucratic restraints over politieal elites, like the establishment of the State 
Planning Organization, in the liberal political asmosphere created by it, the ideologies of 
both the left and the right managed to establish themselves in the political spect-rum. The 
Islamists for the first time organized around an independent political party, the NOP, 
founded by Necmettin Erbakan and later participated in the coalition governments from 
1974 to 1978 through the NSP, again under the leadership of Erbakan and thus succeded 
to legitimize the existence of an Islamic political party.
Wliile Turkey underwent a rapid socio-economic modernization during the decade, 
the old cleavage of the secular progressivism of the center vs. the religious traditiona-lism 
of the periphery began to give way to a left-right division with corresponding set of ideol­
ogies. To be sure, all of these had a direct bearing on the form and substance of the artic­
ulation of “religious conccrns’7-‘'^l
In the 1970s, both the political center and the periphery underwent radical changes. 
The old centre lost its cohe.s'iveness and wholiness. The bureaucracy fragmented and the 
intelligentsia divided along ideological lines^‘’^ \ Above all, the RPP gave up its pro-state 
posture and adopted a social democratic line toward the late 1960s and early 1970s. It lost 
its status of being a natural ally of the military. Paralel with all these, societal forces in­
creasingly penetrated into the state machine, particularly through the formation of clientel- 
istic relations, with political parties. Thus, the age-old insulation of state from society 
came to an end. The state’s responsive character was now to be more manifest^^'’^
The periphery, loo, underwent differentiation with the emergence of the cross­
cutting cleavages in which economic ones increasingly took ascendancy. Since the tradi­
tional loyalties did not cease to exist, as was once incorrectly assumed by the moderniza­
tion theory, there emerged the co-existence of the new economic cleavages with the tradi­
tional behavioral patterns^“’'’^ . This coexistence facilitated the emergence of a group of 
frustrated people caught in the counter pressure of tradition and modernity^^^’\  which pro­
vided a ripe ground for the flourishing of religious movements. The insecurity caused by
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the detachinent from collective entities creates an acute need for “belonging”, a manifesta­
tion of what Peter Berger calls “feeling of homelesnes” ·^'^  ^ Thus, religious movements 
offer security and a brand of identity in the midst of rapid change for those who feel lost 
among the uncomprehesible complexités of mass society.
Toward the end of the 1970s, the increasing fragmentation and polarization around 
the ideological lines of the left and the right led to the most severe political instability Tur­
key faced during the Republican era. Ideological violence and terrorism, fueled by the 
“most anti-Kemalist and anti-systemic expressions of discontent by various groups’T”'*^  
reached unprecedented levels. Islamic politics too was influenced by this state of affairs. 
Islamist political organizations increasingly turned against the secular regime. Tlie Isla­
mist NSP, for example, was giving the signs of turning into an anti-systemic opposition 
movement. The last instance revealing this development was a mass de-monstration held 
in Konya province in which both the leadership and the militants of the NSP shouted anti­
secular slogans and called for Sharia^‘’'^ l Six days after the demonstration, the military in­
tervened in politics and a new era of political restoration began in September 12, 1980.
E. Political Fortune of Islam in Present-Day Turkey
Given the increasing visibility of Islam in Turkish politics in the last decade, the 
fortune of the political Islam in the remoulding of the present system is of immediate con­
cern for the secular political circles. It is evident that coming into power tlirough the elec­
toral process in Turkey is extremely difficult for the Islamists— if not impossible, except 
through participation in coalition governments. For one thing, the Turkish Constitution, 
the Law for the Organization of the Parties and several other laws forbid the advocation of 
the establisment of an Islamic state^ ’^^’^  and as long as this state of affairs endures^^’’\  the 
hope of Islamists to attain their ultimate aims would remain very limited. On the other 
hand, it does not seem probable at all that the military would permit the establishment of 
an Islamic state, as its self-perceived role of being the ultimate guardian of the state and 
the power of last resort for the secularists remains intact.
As the secular way of life made great headways in establishing itself in Turkish so-
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ciety, the Islamists have increasingly become divided. Because of the lack of a common 
leadership, various sufi orders, though securing considerable mass support, are in com- 
petiton witli one another. They are not represented by the same single political party and 
for the moment, there is no indication of such a political unification. The Islamists are 
also deprived of the leadership of the ulema^'’"^  because of their elimination fiom the polit­
ical process during the single party period. Furthermore, the Islamists are not the only po­
litical force that proposes radical alternatives to the present political system. Nationalist 
and socialist ideologies may always become the powerful competitors to the “Islamic al­
ternative”. On top of that, the fortune of the Islamists is closely tied to the persistence of 
the democratic process, as seen with the close down of the NSP in the aftermath of the 
1980 military coup. And ironically enough, as long as the democratic regime survives, 
they would participate in the .system with the “ inevitable” consequence of compromise 
and pragmatism on their part. Finally, the future of the Turkish economy would have crit­
ical effects on the realization of the aspirations of the Islamists. Until now, the liberaliza­
tion of the economy under the MP governments has served to strengthen their economic 
power. The economic sectors under the management of the Islamists have expanded and a 
new Islamist small bourgeoisie has come into existence. On the other hand, as the distri­
bution of income has been increasingly concentrated in fewer hands due to “the growth- 
first” economic strategies, the poor desperately searching for social justice may turn to 
Islam as a form of protesF'’^ \
The post-1980 years in Turkish political life witnessed the transition from Import 
Substitution Industriliazation (ISI) to the outward-oriented growth strategy without pay­
ing due regard to the social condition, alongside the imposition of a “forced consensus” 
on society. While Turkish .society has become subject to a heavy wave of “consumer­
ism”, the ideological conflicts remained minimal. In the meantime, despite the continous 
attempts to keep religion under state control, a tradition dating back to the Ottoman peri­
od, the role of Islam in society and politics followed its own course and set, to an impor­
tant extent, the discourse of Turkish politics. In this context, the expression of political 
Islam at the level of party organization, the PP of Prof. Necmettin Erbakan gradually has 
made its intrusion into the political life. To see how the content, the goals and the political 
di.scour.se of the NSP-PP line were affected by the above described constraints and op­
portunities for Islamic politics in Turkey, it is imperative to look first at the restructuriza­
tion and unfolding of Turkish politics over the last two decade with special reference to 
the NSP-PP line.
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"Muslims in Turkey engage in politics with the 
aim of forging their stand at the level of the ultimate 
state that politics should assume. Therefore, rather 
than to come up with new theses to incorporate 
changes in the political environment, the relevant 
question for Muslims is to struggle for the recognition 
of their rights in accordance with the entirety of their 
beliefs."
—İsmet Özel 
— Görüş, April 1988
2 . SEARCH FOR A DISTINCT ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY
A. Twenty Years of the NSP-PP Line
A meeting was held in Ankara on January 21, 1990 in order to celebrate the 
twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the first political party of the National 
Outlook, the NOP. According to Necmettin Erbakan, the founding father of the NSP-PP 
line. National Outlook is the Turkish nation’s own view, who established a great 
civilization and brought justice and progress to humanity in history over a millennium. 
Likewise, it is the only solution to the contempary problems of Turkish society.
All the political parties which came into power after the transition to multi-party 
politics since 1946, according to Erbakan, have been the blind imitators of either socialist 
or capitalist ideologies produced in the West. These parties could not provide solutions 
for the pressing problems of the nation and brought it to the pre.sent situation of 
helplessness and incapability. Those who saw this state of affairs and believed in the 
indigenous National Outlook, with the aim of founding "Great Turkey once again", 
forged an independent line on the political spectrum through the establishment of the NOP 
on January 24, 1970. The NOP was followed by the formation of the NSP on October 
11, 1972. And with the establishment of the PP in July 19, 1983, the National Outlook 
has reasserted itself with more vigor and dynamism than ever at the end of its twenty 
years
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The main question of the National Outlook is a reflection of the intellectual agenda 
of the nineteenth century Islamists, which finds its expression in the "Islam versus the 
West" predicament. The dilemma was to find an explanation for the rising fortune of the 
W est in view of the continously declining power of the Ottoman Empire, or more 
properly, the whole Muslim world. For Muslim intellectuals at the time, the West owed 
its powerful position vis-a-vis the East to the scientific and technological developments 
which concretized in the industrial revolution and military superiority. Thanks to this 
“ irresistable” military-economic power, the Western World gradually took Muslim lands 
under its hegemony and put an humiliating end to the Muslim World supremacy which 
was represented by the Ottomans till the end of the eighteent century. The relative decline 
of the Muslim umma was interpreted as being caused by the lack of commitment to the 
strict observance of the Islamic precepts which were the underlying progressive drive 
behind the Muslim coirsciousness for the betterment of life both in .spiritual and material 
terms. Hence, to face the Western challenge, it was imperative to take Western science 
and technology on the oite hand, and to retain the indigenous cultural dynamics formed 
throughout centuries with its contours and spirit being shaped and determined within an 
Islamic socio-economic environment, wliich Prof.Neemettin Erbakan called the "National 
Outlook", on the other.
The reception of Western science and technology coupled with the rejection of 
Western philosophical thought and culture rooted in the Greco-Roman and Judeo- 
Christian traditions constituted the mainstream of the Islamic response inherited by the 
Islamic movements all over the Muslim World throughout the twentieth century. In 
Turkey, it was not this conception, however, that found political backing and that was 
translated into public policies . With the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923), 
the view that Islam was responsible for the decline and backwardness of the nation and 
that there was only one civilization, i.c., the Western civilization and therefore the 
wholesale acceptance of the Western science and culture was imperative, received official 
recognition. Thus, Islam cea.sed to be the state religion and the basic means of organizing 
individual and collective human activities as before. The vision of a "protestantinized 
Islam" was espoused. Islam relegated to the conscious of the individual and steps taken to 
ensure its total privatization.
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The leaction in the form of organized efforts and at political party level to the 
modernization policies·pursued by the Kemalist state along the Western patterns, came 
only after the introduction of democratic system after the World War II. If the regulations 
and programmes of the 9, out of 24 parties founded between 1946-1950 are analysized, it 
will be seen (hat Islamic themes received important emphasis^^\ Of these parties, only tlie 
Nation Party (Millet Partisi-NP),— a splinter of the first opposition party in Turkey, was 
relatively long-lived. Yet the NP could not acquire a steady following. In the 1950 
elections it .sent only one representative to the Assembly and was closed down in 1954 on 
the ground that it contradicted the secular tenets of the Republic. In the post-1960 
atmosphere of ideological proliferation came the establishment of the first overtly 
sectaiian-oriented political parly, the Unity Party (Birlik Partisi, UP) headed by Mustafa 
Timisi, which represented basically the Alevi sect in Turkey. Despite the politicisation of 
the sectarian cleavages by so doing, the Alevi community in Turkey did not challenge 
Kemalist conception of secularism and has been no rival to it.
It was in this context that the “political party” was added into the organizational 
patterns of the Islamic movement as well, in the beginning of the early 1970. In fact, 
Islamic political parties turned out to be the most important legal formation of the Islamic 
movement in Turkey. In the 1950s and 1960s there was no outright religious party. 
Thus, the NOP founded by Necmettin Erbakan was the first Islamist political party with 
strongly Sunni orientation.
The word “national” in the name of the NOP has nothing to do with the modern 
notion of nation in that it takes its meaning from the universal .semantics of Islam, which 
can be substituted for the word “religion” as used in the revealed book of Islam, the 
Quran. Accordingly, the “National Order” connotes the universal Islamic Order, i.e., the 
pax Islámica.
In the years preceding his founding of the NOP, Erbakan had been a supporter of 
the JP,— a center-right party carrying with it the legacy of the DP. As secretary general of 
the Union of tile Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1968, he clashed with the then 
prime minister Süleyman Demirel and was removed from that post through the
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governmental initiative. In 1969, Erbakan ran as an independent candidate from the 
province of Konya and elected to the Assembly. In .lanuary 1970, he and his seventeen 
associates established the NOP, its name being coined by a leading Islamist, Eşref Edip. 
The NOP put Islam at the center of its ideological posture and in occasion showed its 
backing of Islamic law and legalism. Since the Party derived its legitimacy from the 
Islamic precepts despite its lip seiwice to the Kemalist understanding of .secularism, after 
the 1971 coup by memorandum, it was closed down by the Constitutional Court on the 
ground that it violated the constitutional provisions regarding secularism.
Though the NOP was .short-lived, nevertheless it set an example that such a party 
can be established on the legal grounds^''^ One year later, on October 11, 1972, the NSP 
was set up by the .same cadre who founded the NOP with latent support of Erbakan^·“’^  
Though it was publicly identified to be the continuation of the NOP in till but name, in 
view of the closing down of the NOP, the NSP’s founders were careful to avoid claiming 
any connection between the two. When asked whether the NSP is heir to the NOP, 
Erbakan asserted that “the NSP is only one of the parties set up so far. It does not make 
.sense to estoblish any connection between them”*^’l
That the leadership of the NSP was the same as that of the NOP was a clear 
indication of the fact that it was the continuation of the NSP under a different name. At 
first, Erbakan refrained from any involvement with the NSP. He did not even join the 
party until May, 1973. The President of the NSP until after the October 1973 election was 
Süleyman A. Emre.
The NSP played an important role in Turkish political life between 1973-1980. The 
elections of 1973 was a notable success for such a party, contesting for power for the 
first time, as the NSP. It received 11.8 per cent of the total vote and gained 48 seats in the 
parliament and became the third stiongest party after the RPP (186 seats) and the JP (150 
.seats). Despite its low electoral support, due to the inability of the two big political par­
ties, the RPP and the .IP, to form a majority government, it became the key to the forma­
tion of coalition governments, as symbolized in the emblem of the party, which was a 
key.
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In 1974, it entered the coalition with the social democratic RPR The populistic as­
pect of the NSP programme was the reason for this “historical comproinise” on the part 
of R P P /') Being in power, on the other hand, provided legitimization for tiie NSP and 
secured its existence against being closed downf**). But the uneasy coalition did not sur­
vive for long and was dissolved by the RPP following the Cyprus crisis of 1974. What 
followed was the formation of the first National Front government including the JP, the 
NSP, the Nationalist Action Party (Miliyetçi Hareket Partisi, NAP) and the Reliance Party 
(Güven Partisi, RP). Again, what was important for the NSP was to stay in power. It 
pursued a very active line in the coalition and got political concessions unproportional to 
its electoral succes,s^‘^ (
In the June 1977 election, the NSP received 8.5 per cent of the vote and gained 24 
seats. But, the absolute number of votes cast for the NSP remained almost the same 
around 1. 25 million. Due to the several reasons, which will be elaborated in the follow­
ing chapter, the NSP’s parliamentary representation fell by half. The following one-year 
National Front government under the leadership of Demirel and with the participation of 
the NSP and the NAP did not register any success in coping with the exacerbating prob­
lems of terror and high rate of inflation and was replaced by the RPP government in Janu­
ary 1978, with the support of some former JP members.
Under this administration, terrorism and inflation persisted and reached ‘unbeara­
ble’ levels. After the 1979 by-elections, which was a clear victory for the JP, the RPP left 
the power. A minority JP government was formed with the outside support of the NSP 
and the NAP. A new economic stabilization program was initiated by the government and 
some success was gained against inflation. Yet, terror contiuned. In the end, the persist­
ing political instability was followed by a military intervention.
The NSP was closed down along with other political parties after the militaiy coup 
of 12 September, 1980. The military administration was deteirnined to restructure the rule 
of political game in line with Kemalist principles and accordingly, Erbakan and thirty 
three members of the NSP’s General Administrative Board were arrested in April 1981 
and charged with working for the overthrow of the secular state to be replaced by an Is-
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lamic one and specifically, violating tlie article 163 of the Penal Code^'”\  As Toprak aptly 
points out, despite the non-involvement of the NSP in the pre-1980 civil strife, due to the 
“open-ended nature of existing laws”^"  ^penalizing the use of religion for politieal pur­
poses, it was not difficult to gather enough evidence to that effect. In February 1983, Er­
bakan was sentenced to four years of imprisonment and twenty-two other members of the 
NSP received prison sentences ranging from two to three ycars^'^l In September 1985, 
however both he and his associates were acquitted.
After the assumption of political power by the military, all political activities in Tur­
key were suspended. In 1981, all political parties which existed at the time of intervention 
were abolished. The military Junta continuously emphasized the temporary character of its 
rule and promised the restoration of democratic life after the establishment of a new legal- 
institutional framework for politics, which would protect the state and increase its govern­
ing capability vis-a-vis the “excesses” of civil society which were thought to be caused 
mainly by the highly libera! Constitution of 1961.
According to the National Security Council, comprising the junta members, in the 
absence of clearly drawn boundaries between state and society, the widened scope of 
democratic rights and liberties had turned out to be a major catalyst in the hypeipolitieiza- 
tion of ideological cleavages and state institutions which had led to fragmentation of the 
state apparatus along ideological divisions including the police force and a deadlock in po­
litical governance which further precipitated the anarchy and terror. Thus, the aim was to 
create a new politico-legal framework in order to prevent the emergence of the pre-1980 
hyperpoliticisation of societal forces which ended up with the breakdown of democratic 
governance. Reaction to the problematical aspects of party politics as the military leaders 
understood it was basic to their efforts in restructuring Turkish political life. Hence, 
through the newly-drafted Constitution, they placed the requirements of the pre.servation 
of law and older before individual rights and liberties, which could be suspended in ca.se 
of emergency or a threat challenging the public order. Extensive limitations were put on 
the organizational patterns and scope of activities of political parties and interest groups. 
Political parties were barred from establishing women, youth or any other organization 
affiliated with them. They also were isolated from interest group associations and vice
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versa. Labor unions, too, were forbidden to engage in politics. State-society relations 
were restructured in such a way that the scope of activities envisaged to be within the 
sphere of civil society came under virtual control of political society, i.e., the state. The 
channels of interest articulation and interest aggregation were heavily narrowed down.
Apart from the constitutional regulations, the Election Law, too, was changed so as 
to prevent the recurrence of a characteristic feature of the pre-1980 period, namely the 
lack of political governance caused by coalition or minority governments. Thus, in order 
for a party to be represented in the Assembly, it has to receive 10 percent of the total vote 
as well as to exceed the barrage at the district level in order to gain a seat in a given electo­
ral district. The barrage at the district level was determined according to the number found 
by the division of the valid votes with the number of representatives to be elected from 
that district·^'^^ All these arrangements aimed at the prevention of the representation of the 
small parties thought to be the major cause of governmental instability in the pre-1980 pe­
riod, particularly the Islamist NSP and the Turkist National Action Party. It clearly fa­
vored the big parties in the electoral competition, with the aim of establishing a two-party 
system, freed from coalition governments.
The 1983 Political Parties Law^’'*^ banned the top administrative cadres of the pre- 
1980 political parties comprising some hundred people, from associating with political 
parties for ten years. The limitation for the members of the pre-1980 Assembly was five 
years. Also, the newly-established parties were prohibited from using those emblems and 
images that would te  considered by the public opinion as the indications of being the con­
tinuation of the former political parties.
The legal regulations of the post-1980 period was envisaged in line with the author­
itarian reconstruction of state and civil society with a view of using all the means fostering 
depoliticisation at the individual and public level in order to create a new pattern of politics 
which would forge sensitivity toward the protection of general interest as well as sectional
ones
When the start was given for the multi-party politics in 1983 once again, it soon be­
came evident that mudi of the social engineering of the military administration is doomed
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to failure in that it has found virtually no counterpart in society. The results of the 1983 
general election and 1984 municipal election showed that much remained the same in poli­
tics. This sameness was reflected especially in the continuation of the political spectrum 
sti Lictured along the right-left axis '^^’l  In other words, there was no critical realignment of 
the electorate, for as "the mists were getting clearer", all the parties, except the MP, relat­
ed themselves in one way or another to the past and actively supported by the pre-1980 
leaders. Yet, “each included new members, new ideas such that none could rightly be 
called an exact replica of the pre-1980 parties” '^^^
Against this background, a new Islamist party, the PP was founded in 1983 to fill 
the gap after the closing down of the NSP, by a group of ex-NSP members. The Party 
could not participate in the 1983 election despite its completion of legal requirements due 
to the series of vetoes of its founding members by the National Security C ouncif'^l It 
participated in the municipal elections of March 25, 1984, however, and received 4.8 per­
cent of the total votes. Also its candidates were elected in the provinces of Urfa and Van.
The First General Congres of the Party was held in Ankara on 30 June, 1985. Ah­
met Tekdal was re-elected as the party leaded
Due to the political ban on the pre-1980 political leaders, the new parties who relat­
ed themselves to the previous parties were using many symbols and slogans which re­
ferred to their past predecessors. Thus, the PP was known as the “Party of the Hodja”, or 
the “Party of Erbakan” ^^ '’^ .The underlying reason for such a popular diagnosis was the 
political identity of the party’s founders as well as the slogans used by the party. The PP, 
like the N>SP, was the proponent of the “National Outlook” and its spokesmen repeatedly 
talked of the “Heavy Industry Effort”, again one of the main mottos of the NSP.
A composition comprising an ear and crescent was chosen as the party’s symbol. 
According to the party programme, the Cresent represents the honourable struggle in the 
World War I, the war of Dardanelles (Çanakkale Savaşı) and the war of Independence, 
which paved the way for the foundation of the Republic. The ear symbolizes prosperity, 
abundance and peace. It is, at the same time, the symbol of the will and determination of 
the Turkish nation to surpass the present level of the contemporary c i v i l i z a t i o n . I n
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short, it is the co-articulation of the spiritual and material development, which was the ba­
sic tenet of the defunct NSP.
in the environment of the rising opposition against the political bans, a referendum 
was held so as to reach a popular decision about the removal of them on 6 September, 
1987. All the political parties except the ruling MP, actively supported the removal of the 
bans. At the end of the referendum, with a very slight majority, the ex-politicians were 
given the right to engage in politics. Immediately following the referendum, Necmettin 
Erbakan, th.e ex-leader of the NSP, took the leadership of the PP.
Given this background, it is important to analyze the politics of the PP in the con­
text of the post-1980 Islamization policies, the cooptation of the former NSP electorate 
into the MP, the increasing universalization in line with the political atmospher created by 
the rising Islamic fundamentalism all over the Muslim world as well as the changing na­
ture of the power equation between Sufi orders and the Islamic groups including the 
most radical wings and the NSP-PP line.
B. The NSP-PP Line and the Center-Right Parties
The NSP emerged as an important rival to the center-right JP with its political ap­
peal to the same electoral base in the 1970s. Until the appearance of the NSP in the politi­
cal scene , the “religious vote” i.e., the segment of electorate who determines its political 
preferences according to the dictates of Islamic teachings, had an important role in cajxy- 
ing the JP to power. When the NSP appeared in the political arena with an independent 
Muslim identity and rallying the religious vote behind it, it stroke a heavy blow to the 
JP ’s electoral support base. Thus, in 1973 elections, the .IP’s vote fell to 29.8 percent 
from 46.5 percent of the 1969 election, the NSP being one of the major beneficiaries of 
that situation. A fierce competition and rivalry characterized the relations between the two 
party throughout the 1970s. The JP accused the NSP of dividing the rightist votes and 
hence causing the left to get strengthened. To cite an example, in the 1977 election cam­
paign, Demirel criticized the NSP in the following terms;
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(he NvSF^  is not nii(ionnIis(. (For Dcmircl, 7\irkisli politics n( (he (ime was divided along 
na(ionaIisi-Ier(is( lines.) K'is no( clear wha( i( is. 'I'he National Outlook, as they call it, is 
nothing but nonsense. The votes casted Гог (he NSP can be considered as casted for (he
r PP-(22)
Against these accusations, Erbakan responded by calling the JP as a colourless par­
ty, meaning lacking any stable ideological commitment. It shared the same mentality, 
claimed Erbakan, with the leftist RPP. For him, the JP was just on the capitalist side of 
the emulators of the West. There was a slight difference of appearance with respect to 
their stance toward Westernization and henee the negation of the National Outlook. The 
competition between the JP and NSP for the religious vote resulted in “drifting” increas­
ingly to the right on the side of the JP, while the NSP incorporated the developmentalist 
theses of the JP into its discourse. The NSP stood on the same ground with the JP re­
garding the creation of “Great Turkey”, — a famous motto of the JP, but modified it as 
"Great Turkey once again" in line with its strong .sen,se of history. Also, it shared the 
same views with the conservative wing of the JP with respect to its cultural orientation.
In fact, one can safely suggest that the establishment of the NSP provided the con­
servative wing of the JP with an active and determinative political platform. In other 
words, they managed to have their parties whereby they can easily articulate and if possi­
ble, implement their programmes independently. Politics for them became more comforta­
ble in ethical terms. I'he same feeling of easiness was shared by those Muslims who par­
ticipated in politics through casting their votes in the elections.
This differentiation from the JP was materialized particularly in the anti-Westernist 
discourse of the NSP articulated with traditional Islamic terminology against the secular- 
Westernist discourse of the political regime for the first time in Republican history. The 
NSP did not face much difficulty with its distinctly Islamic stand in securing the support 
of the mas.ses who were overwhelmed under the suppression of the secularist front and 
managed to establish for itself a steady following. As Kongar suggests, this state of af­
fairs points to the fact that a political party can not take into account only the demands of 
its political support base and ignore the constraints imposed by the socio-political struc­
ture within which it has to operate. Similarly, it can not continue to exist as a “counter-
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reaction This was especially true in the case of the NSi’ because its religious
symbolism was appropriated by all the parties at the centre right of the political spectrum 
and used succesfully in the elections, as seen in 1977, which registered a relative failure 
for the NSP. Yet, relatively speaking, there was no major competitor to the NSP for the 
religious vote throughout 1970s.
Following 12 vSepternber military coup of 1980, however, the political discourse of 
the NSP, with its tradition of intra-system opposition, which got radicalized from time to 
time, faced directly with the competition of the state, reflecting itself in the official Islami- 
zation policies such that an Islamist writer concluded that nothing left for the PP to capi­
talize upon other than the conversion of St. Sophia into the status of mo.sque^ '^'^ once 
again as the focal point of religious concerns dominating the agenda of the religious cir­
cles since the 1950s. Some of the Islamic motives were carefully articulated into the offi­
cial discourse provided that it did not reach the level of eroding the secular foundation of 
the state. Moreover, under the first MP government, the channels of political participation 
for the sufî oidcrs and other religious groups were given a semi-legality. This state of af­
fairs caused the loss of mass support to the PP on the one hand, and led it into an ideo­
logical impas.se, on the other< -^ \^
'Ilie radical changes in the state policy toward the Islamic movement and de facto le­
galization of sufî orders resulted in the cooptation of the most of the NSP cadres and elec­
torate into the MP and also ensured the support of the majority of the Nurcus, the stream­
line of Nakşibendi Order and Suleymancis, thus depriving the PP of mass support to an 
important extent.
As seen in the 1984 municipal elections, the PP fared poorly because it could not 
regain the support of its ex-followers who had voted for the MP in 1983. It was only af­
ter March 1989 municipal elections that the PP obtained 9.8 % of the votes, and thus the 
religious vote made a comeback to the PP.
As a student of Turkish politics. Mümtaz Soysal, points out, compared to the MP, 
the PP proved to be much more consistent and successful in articulating Islamic values as 
the underlying framework for its political di.scour.se. The sharp constrast between the neo-
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ccnsei'valive economic policies and self-lielp ideology regarding the social solidarity and 
welfare measures adopted by the ruling MP on the one hand, and its much-talked Islam- 
ism on the other, led to the irreconcilable conflicts, even within the MP itselP^'^l
Using religion as a means of securing obedience and self-sacrifice for the masses 
while fostering "consumerism" appeared to be self-defeating for the MP and immensely 
contributed in the erosion of its image as a totally new party which was responsive to the 
sensitivities and interests of the religious segments of society.
The PP, however, had an Islamic discourse rejecting the introduction of the con­
sumption patterns of capitalist societies and prescribing a just distribution of income and 
wealth through redistributive social policies as well as the promotion of economic growth 
in consonant with, the.se policies.
At the end of a long and difficult process, the PP emerged as the main candidate for 
th.e religious vote. Although adopted a nationalist-conservative posture, which determined 
the contours of its ideological commitment as expressed in its party programme, the MP 
was portraid as a ‘materialist’ party, acting in accordance with the dictates of material in­
terests. As the secretary-general of the PP, Oguzhan Asiltiirk, commented:
"... If the MP was a con.scrvativc-spirilualist parly, it would iiol destroy (he morals of (he 
Turkisli nation (o such an exicni. Bribery, corruplion, and (he moral decadence have Ixicomc 
(he routine pad o f every d.ay life. Proslilulion lias come (o embrace all jiarls o f .society. Un­
der (he MP governments, (he slate’s rc.sourccs and properties were plundered... While (he 
MP governments destroyed all (he moral and .spiritual values of .society, we still .see some 
orders propagating (he view (h;i( ‘we perform our prayers and other religious duties without 
any government interference’. It is sheer deception to say ‘may God be pleased with them 
(i.e, the leadership cadre of (he MP) in (hat we have a prime minister in charge ofadm inis-
tration who is a practicing Muslim”'^(27)
In fact, Turgul Ozal had conte.sted under the NSP ticket in 1977 general election.s 
from Iztnir province and actively participated in the N,SP’.s election cainpaign. Therefore, 
he wa.s a familar and relitible political figure for the ex-N,SP supporters when he emerged
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as (lie leader of (lie MP in 1983, and accordingly managed to secure their “ loyalties”. But, 
with the end of official Islamization policies in the late 1980s and the increasing “econom­
ization” of political discourse, coupled with a strongly pro-Western foreign policy, which 
culminated in Turkey’s application to the European Community for full membership ac­
celerated the alienation of the religious vote from the MP. As the analysis of the March 
1989 municipal elections clearly demonstrated, the PP took its votes back from the MP.
In the context of the PP-MP competition for tlie religious vote, it must be noted that 
the MP was identified as being the practical ‘reincarnation’ of the Kemalist ideology. As 
one of the frequent contributors to the PP’s .semi-official daily. Milli Gazete, ismet Özel 
asserted, the MP, in the final analysis, shares the same aims with the Kemalist line re­
garding the total submission of Turkey to the world capitalist system. Thus, the policies 
of the MP must be seen in this light. Against the submissive and dependent relations char­
acteristic of the Kemalist line vis-a-vis the world system, the PP represents the counter 
tendency which rejects any compromise, even under the most disadvantaged conditions, 
with that system. Espousing a foreign policy independent of Western interests and oppos­
ing Turkey’s entering the European Community, this stand of tlie PP in the diluted politi­
cal environment of Turkey points to its aviodance of breaking the credibility of its atti­
tude regarding the negation of being identified with the established order in exchange of 
votes^^®^
C. The NSP-PP Line And The Islamic Groups
The NvSP was establi.shed on the consensus of a large segment of the Nurcus and 
the Nakşibendi Order. This is a clear indication of the primary role played by the sufi or­
ders and religious groups in the repoliticization of Islam in Turkey. The political sociliaza- 
tion of the many leading members of the NSP had been effected through the organization­
al networks of the orders. To cite a few examples, people like Necmettin Erbakan, Hasan 
Aksay and Korkut Özal were the disciples of tlie late Nakşibendi Sheikh Mehmed Efendi 
while A. Tevfik Paksu, Gündüz Sevilgen and H. Akmumcu were the followers of Said 
Nursi, the founder of the Risale-i Nur movement in Turkey^^'^\
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In fact, tlie orders provide an important network for gathering votes by assuming 
the role of tlie intermediary linkage structures in societies where traditional power stme- 
tures are still in operation despite the introduction of modern institutions such as political 
parties, as has been the case in Turkey^^* )^. The NSP as a modern and secular type of or­
ganization which operatal within the legal limits set by the Constitution was subject to the 
constraints imposed by the secular political framework which restricted its scope of activi­
ties and area of mobilization. This is why, the NSP was .secondary in importance com­
pared to the orders within the body politics of the Islamic movement in the beginning of 
the 1970s. The orders and religious groups who supported the NSP were functioning as 
the bodies of supervision over its activities and political maneuvers because of the fact 
that the NSP was running the risk of integration with the system. The interpretation of the 
“NSP affair” in Turkish politics by the Nakşibendi Sheikh Mehmed Zahid Efendi is strik­
ing in this respect; According to him,
“K was a mistake for Muslims to participate in politics. Under the pre.sent conditions in 
Turkey any attempt aiming at the restoration of the Islamic political authority is doomed to 
failure and would lead to a bloody confrontation with the secular forces. Instead, a more ap- 
[xuiate orientation would be the establishment of Islamic society in an informal way, which 
inevitably would end up with the emergence of the Islamic state. At any rate, the NSP,—at 
least in its first state, with its implied Islamic reference of political ideas, can be considered 
to be a secondary political component of this .social pr(x;ess”^^9.
De.spite mobilizing the covert backing of .some orders, the NSP could not manage to 
get the support of all the constituent parts of the organized Islam. The streamline of Nur- 
cus, Siileymancis and some other orders continued to give their support to the JP. Behind 
this support was the recognition of the fact that in order to continue their activities without 
the state’s interference as well as to obtain material benefits for their clienteles, they need­
ed the support of JP. In other words, they placed the exigencies of “political pragmatism” 
before highly-valued moral ideals
The participation of the NSP in government as a coalition partner with the RPP, 
repre.sentative of the Kemalist reforms and identified with ‘communism’ in the eyes of re-
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ligious masses in 1974, evoked a great opposition within the Party, especially from those 
members who had a Nurcu background. Later, the statements and actions of the leader­
ship of the NSP in the direction of making Islam the exclusive doctrine of the party and 
threatening of those Muslims who did not vote for the NSP with losing their place within 
the Muslim community, i.e., being considered non-Muslim, further alienated the Nurcu 
group within the Party. Prior to tlie 1977 elections, the Nurcu members resigned from the 
NSP. Some of them participated in the establishment of the Order Party (Nizam Partisi, 
NP),— not to be confused with the NOP, as tlie alternative to the NSP. Basic to the Nur­
cu ’s criticisms of the NSP was that it has turned out to be a “manometer keeping the ten­
sion of the Islamic movement at the desired point”. For instance, one of the leaders of this 
group, A. Tevfik Paksu criticized the NSP along the following lines:
“The founclalion of the N.SP mu.sl have a.s.suined (lie role of a school. And the parly organi­
zation must have been educalcd as lo how lo evalúale the present events and develop a prop­
er line of action toward them alongside the leaching of the Islamic principles. Rather than 
insisting on the atlainnienl of the end result, it mu.sl have been loughi that our duly is lo 
persevere in the right way and only inform people about the Islamic truths; not lo expect 
them lo come to espouse those truths. It must have been known that the main puipo.se in 
all doings was lo obey God and to act in accordance with his con.senl. All lhe,se were not 
observed thoroughly and properly... The NSP has been made a victim. The mistakes and 
improper actions were ascribed lo Islam in the person of the NSP such that the public im­
age of Islam and Muslims have lx:cn adversely affected”^^ '^ .^
As Mardin pointed out, the Nurcu’s criticism of the NSP had its roots in the history
of Islam and is a reflection of the desire for the Nizam-i Islami (the Islamic Order). The
Nurcus put the realization of the moral aspects of Islam before the exigencies of the im-
♦
mediate political context and hence emphasizes the need to avoid ascribing Islam an in­
strumental role in the attainment of political goals^ '^^l
What the Nak§ibendis and Nurcus share in common in their criticisms of the NSP 
is that the NSP’s opposition to the “ .system” has been passive and it has increasingly be­
come part of that “system”. Also notewhorthy that the NSP could not formulate suffi-
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ciently concrete solutions to the complex problems brought about by the modernization 
process due to its “adoration for the glorious past” -^^”’\  though it has developed relatively 
detailed suggestions regarding economic problems.
Throughout the first years of its establishment following 1983, the PP claimed to be 
the inheritor of the NSP on all accounts, while it gradually put an end to its secondary 
role vis-a-vis the orders within the Islamic movement, unlike the NSP and as it has wid­
ened its political support base, by establishing a place at the center of the Islamic move­
ment for itself. Erbakan and his associates made the distinction between what is religious 
and what is political clearer and accordingly ascribed the religious and social functions to 
the orders while they retained politics within their sphere of authority. But, in time, Erba­
kan took all the initiative and tried to relegate the orders to a subordinate position vis-a-vis 
the party. This generated a direct confrontation between Erbakan and the present 
Nakşibendi Sheikh Esad Coşan. Coşan heavily criticized Erbakan in public for saying 
that “tho.se who do not blend their allegiance to me, must look for a new religion” and in­
creasingly came to question the fundamental premises of the organized sufism^^'’\  This 
new stance was confirmed by Oguzhan Asiltiirk, the the secretary-general of the PP as 
follows:
“Wc. (lie leaders of (lie PP, do no( belong (o any order. As a ma((er of faet, all (he orders 
have equal slanding in oiir eyes. The niys(ical affilia(ion of (hose who suppor( our parly is 
no( a matter of inlercsl for us provided (hat (hey participate in our struggle within our 
ranks"^^^^.
The PP increasingly tend to adopt an all-embracing stand toward the orders such 
that no order now constitutes its backbone of political support by itself. The PP, unlike 
the NSP, is said to espouse a new approach in order to be the focal point of the common 
political will of all the orders in Turkey and accordingly envisages to establish no .special 
ties with any order, which would furnish them with the exclusive control and supervi­
sion over the party cadres and policies. Though still lend their support, to a large extent, 
to the PP, it .seems that the Nakşibendis have lost their exceptional status within the ranks 
of the PP. In addition, the Muslims who vote for parties other than the PP are no longer
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severely accused of serving the interests of the infidels, at least at the leadership level, as 
it was the case during the 1970s. Yet, the orders are not ready to accept such a pattern of 
relationship that runnes the risk of loosing their distinct identity and merging with the pai - 
ty. In fact, one of the underlying reasons for the orders’s support of tlie centre-right par­
ties has been the appropriate political ground provided by those parties whereby they can 
assert their distinct religious identity without any risk of “assimilation” in lending their 
support to them. Thus, a Muslim writer sympathetic to the PP, Ömer Hatipoğlu, suggests 
that if the PP should go beyond the parochial loyalties of sectarian kind and not turn into 
a political party “order”, it has strictly to avoid catering to only the interests of some or­
ders while ignoring those of others. This, he points out, is, in fact, expressed by Necmet­
tin Erbakan too, when he declared that the “PP is the party of all the believers and of the 
oppressed. It is ready to embrace everybody regardless of his past political preferences.”
(38)
An important factor which may radically transform the present nature of the rela­
tionship between the PP and orders is the former’s increasingly strengthened possibility 
of largening its electoral support which would provide it with the parliamentary represen­
tation. Building an image of continously growing party may accelerate the return of the 
“volatile” segment of the “religious vote” to the PP, or at least, neutralizing the counter at­
titudes of the orders supporting liberal-conservative rightist parties against the PP. This is 
bound to what extent the PP would catcli up with the new axis reflecting the common will 
of the Islamic power base in Turkey* '^^^
If the PP succeeds to get the support of those sufi orders back which have been the 
loyal supporters of the MP so far and now, after the last General Congress of the MP in 
1991, in which the Muslim faction within it was virtually excluded from the leadership 
ranks, it may get the chance of being represented in the National Assembly with most 
probability by further eroding the political support base of the MP. In short, the NSP-PP 
line with its leading role in the politicisation of the religious masses was and is the main 
eandidate for the religious vote en masse.
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D. The NSP-PP Line And The Islamic Radicalism
As noted before, the radical wing of the Turkish Islamic movement, which was fur­
ther activated in line with the overall Islamic “perestroika” experienced in the Muslim 
world and gained a new and strong dynamism with the political successes of the Iranian 
Islamic revolution, succeeded in forging an anti-systemic strategy of struggle against the 
secular regime and hence increasingly directed its criticisms to the “pro-state” Islamic or­
ders and to the political line represented by the NOP, the NSP and the PP, respectively, 
which do not propose a drastically different perspective from that of the Islamic faction 
within the MP.
With its actively militant stand, the Muslim radicals have come up with a “new tra­
dition” of waging struggle against the anti-Islamic establishment and managed to create 
an intellectual circle around themselves. Though marginal in number, this intellectual dy­
namism furnished them with a power potential to succesfully challenge the leadership of 
the PP, which appeared to be incapable of internalizing that challenge because of its rela­
tively insufficient and intellectually wanting ideological and pragmatic dispositions^'’' l^
For the radicals, party politics, being an institution of the secular democracies and 
having no Islamic roots, does not possess Islamic legitimacy, and hence there can not be 
an Islamic political party which articulates its ideology and political discourse in line with 
the democratic rules of political game. For a party to represent a political ideology, there 
should be clear references in that party’s programme to the ideology it espouses and ac­
cordingly, the road to power should be in consonant with the methodological principles 
defined by that ideology.
Taking this conceptualization as the starting point, one can conclude that if a politi­
cal party claims to represent the Islamic ideology,— publicly or covertly, it can not adopt a 
secular-democratic or Marxist type of strategy in the road to political power, for that 
would be self-defeating. Becau.se, Islam teaches that the Islamic legitimate ends can only 
be attained through legitmate means. Anything contrary to this prescription leads to the 
loss of Islamic legitimacy and doing away from the ultimate purpose of attaining G od’s 
consent. The idea that “ the end justifies the means” has no equivalent in Islam. Because,
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such a stand would inevitably end up with the violation of Islamic principles of justice 
and mercy in, the road to power. This state of affairs requires the postponment of the ob­
servance of the divine injunctions and prohibitions,— something that leads to the suspen­
sion of the sovereignty of God.
In view of all these, a leading representative of the Muslim radicals, Erciimend 
Özkan, asserts that an Islamic party can not aspire for the running of the secular- 
democratic regimes and hence can not contest for power in the elections,— be it general or 
local. For him, the main mission of an Islamic party, which organized in a non-Islamic 
political society, is to aim at the total change at the systemic level. According to Özkan, 
being against the unbelief requires to avoid any intermingling with or adopting an eclectic 
stand toward it. Therefore, Muslims must not get involved in any ways or means in the 
socio-political framework suggested by the secular regimes ascribing the sovereignty of 
God to people. For the restriction of the sovereignty to God is an absolute cofollaiy of the 
principle of Tawhid, i.e,the oneness of God, as prescribed in the Quran. The absolute 
sovereignty of God confers absolute certainty and truthness to the Islamic dogmas, which 
are in sheer contrast to the democratic conception of life. Drawing upon the agnostic pre­
scription of the impossibility of attaining the truths that would be shared by all humanity, 
democracies prefer to solve the conflicts and detennine the tentative truths by counting the 
heads, i.e, by the majority rule.
Therefore, espousing an Islamic political stand, on the one hand, and conferring le­
gitimacy to the political democracies on the other, would lead to enter comprimise with 
those regimes and to give up the binding Islamic rules regulating and guiding the right 
ways and means of the Islamic struggle. In this context, it is not enough for a political 
party, which is under the leadership of practising Muslims, to be an Islamic one unless its 
programme and regulation are prepared with an Islamic outlook. The underlying reason 
behind the misconception of the Nation Party and the following the NOP-NSP-PP line by 
the religious masses is their inability of drawing the proper distinction line between the 
“real Islam” of the Quran and the “the official Islam” of the state offered for mass con- 
sumptionf'"\
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For Muslim radicals, the focal point of the discussions centering around the Islamic 
character of the political line represented through political party formation is to develop an 
hollistic approach as to how to deal with the problems emerged in a Muslim society gov­
erned by a secular state. According to this analysis, any movement presenting its mission 
to be the best alternative option providing a packet of concrete solutions for the present 
socio-economic problems generated within a secular socio-economic millieu carries a re­
formist tendency within it. Such movements are expected to reschedule and revise their 
programmes and political positions in harmony witli the changing conditions. This state 
of affairs, in turn, leads to the adoption of an intra-systemic posture while giving up the 
struggle located at the anti-systemic level. In terms of the present stand of the PP, it is not 
clear whether the understanding that “to the problems not generated by the Islamic socie­
ty, Islamic solutions can not be offered” is valid or not. To take social and economic con­
ditions as “given” and trying to produce concrete solutions accordingly, ends up with re­
formism, which is in sharp contrast to the line preached in the authentic sources of Islam 
Aiming at the total transformation of society at the systemic level, on tlie other hand, 
necessitates the adoption of a radical posture, in which case, it would not be possible to 
.secure a legal existence given the present constitutional restraints. Although Erbakan per­
sistently declares that the National Outlook has an “axiomatic certitude” '^*^  ^implying that it 
is a perfect articulation of the Islamic ideology under the pre.sent conditions and thus 
adopting a rigid stand with respect to the ideological change, nevertheless his party, in the 
final analysis, carries within it the potential for turning into an European type Christian 
DP, which accepts the .secularism as the bedrock of political society, while maintaining its 
pro-religion political po.sture '^''*  ^ The validity of this tentative suggestion, of course, re­
mains to be seen. For the present, as the carrier of the Islamic identity in the democratic 
platform, the PP seems to be an effective means for Muslims to obtain relative gains rath­
er than to a.spire for a radical transformation of society.
In order to better analyze the relationship between party politics and change from an 
Islamic vantage point, one must, in the first place, identify the position of the PP against 
the opposition of the radical wing of the Islamic movement to party politics. According to 
Ahmet Tekdal, the leader of the PP until Erbakan assumed the leadership in 1987, politics
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is the only way for Muslims to rule over the system. In his speech in the first General 
Congress of the PP, he concluded that
“Tho.se wlio arc against politics or remain apallictic to it can go no where through engaging 
in science and intellectual pursuits or tollowing an extemporaneous way of life. Under the 
pre.scnt conditions, to live an honored and free life in accordance with what our belief .sys­
tem dictates would be possible only when the cadres of the PP come into power“*^'’‘’\
The great efforts spent in order to persuade the believers into the necessity of en­
gaging in politics were explained by the party’s chairman of the Istanbul branch as an at­
tempt to unravel and frustrate a plot of the World Zionism;
“Just as Zionists discouraged Muslims from engaging in commerce by saying ‘leave the 
balance, go to the pilgrimage’ in the past, so now (hey are striving for procuring the non- 
inolvement of Muslims in politics. Through the policy of dcpoliticisation o f tlie Muslim 
masses, they tried to determine the direction of Turki,sh politics during the military rule of  
1980- 1983’ ’<'’ ''’\
According to the proponents of party politics, Muslims have to live within the sys- 
tem and act in line with the framework determined by the decisions taken on behalf of 
them-whether they lake part in the making of those decisions or not. They are forced to 
go to the underground so as not to recognise their legal rights when need be and live un­
der the pyschological as well as ideological pressures of an organized and wealthy mi­
nority. Against all these constraints set for the subordination of the Muslims, to be able to 
get and use the democratic rights and liberties which would provide Muslims with a say 
in decision-making process, it is necessary to organize around a political party, the most 
important intermediary structures in democracies for interest aggregation and articulation 
The democratic system based on free and competitive elections tend to open the 
valves blocking the road for Muslims to the political power. Because this fact is very well 
understood by the guardians of the system, the democratic process was suspended three 
times in the last thirty years.
From an historical point of view, the representation of religious concerns in the 
democratic process through a political party organisation is a unique experience for Mus­
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lims. Contrary to the periods when the religion was under the protection of tlie state, now 
for tlie first time, Muslims, are in a position to undertake the function of supervision and 
control over state. Similarly, it is alien to the Muslim tradition to address the ordinary 
people through mass media. A tradition enrooted in informal gatherings in the mosques, 
seminars and dervish lodges now has to go beyond the networks of communication char­
acterized by face to face relations and revolutionize its patterns of communication in order 
to reach the large groups of people. This can best be achieved through organizations such 
as associations, trade unions and most important of all, political parties. The NSP-PP line 
successfully adopted itself to requirements brought about by the transition from commu­
nal to societal patterns of social relations^'”*l
In fact, alongside their opposition to party politics, the Muslim radicals seem to ex­
ert important, pressure over the leadership of the PP regarding their tradition of intra­
system opposition with its relatively moderate tone of political discourse. In this regard, 
like the NSP, the PP, too, in occasions, can take a radical stand over some issues, as 
seen in the frontal attack of its mayor of Urfa province toward secularism and Ataturkism 
in 1989^ '*'^^  Until now, however, the manifestations of the Islamic reassertion of the re­
cent years in the NSP-PP line have remained limited to the recreation of an Islamic socio­
cultural environment, free of Western influences^- '^’\
As Mardin obsei^ved, the most crucial steps in the secularization process were taken 
in the field of the legal system. As such, “the re-islamization of Turkish life” can, in the 
last analysis, be effected through changes in the legal sytem. Yet, the NSP-PP line, in 
line with its “ tradition” of extreme caution regarding the avoidance of the direct confronta­
tion with the state, has not capitalized on that issue and dwelled upon the cultural and eco­
nomic aspects of de-islamization process ‘^’9. Thus, it can be suggested that if the PP can 
not internalize or manage the radical tendencies within and outside the Party through pro­
viding an effective leadership and reformulation of its ideological posture or, at least, its 
political discourse, it may loose that initative to the Nationalist Work Party (Miliyetçi 
Çalışma Partisi, NWP), which has incorporated much more radical tendencies, and under 
the impact of Islamic reassertion in the 1980s adopted a more Islamic posture '^^^^
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It is interesting to note that in recent years, there has emerged an anti-modemist dis­
course which questions Western science and technology and tries to provide an Islamic 
alternative against modern way of life, particularly among the new generation of Muslim 
intellectuals. Ironically, this line of thought had been spurred by an intellectual who has 
shared the same views with the NSP-PP line with respect to party politics^·’^  ^ Seeing the 
problems generated by the technology-dominated modern way of life as the indications of 
the contradiction between man’s desire for power and his ethical ideals, an alternative and 
rightful “way out” is envisaged by drawing upon an Islamic socio-political millieu. This 
is clearly in sharp contrast to the NSP-PP’s modernist line, which puts great emphasis on 
industrialization and yet inspired by the same sources as the young Muslim radicals re- 
gai ding de-westernization. It sees the realization of economic growth as the basic means 
of breaking the “chains of the World Capitalist System” and thereby creating “Great Tur­
key once again” '^“’''^ Because the notion of “development”— both material and spiritual, is 
so central to the National Outlook, it is hardly possible that the anti-modernist stand of the 
young radicals would have any effect on the policy-makers of the NSP-PP line.
E. The NSP-PP Line and the Islamic Universalism
Muslims in Turkey could not articulate their views under the Islamic rubrics owing 
to the persistence of the “militant” conception of secularism until the 1970s. In the 1950s, 
Muslims were on the “reactionary” side of the political spectrum while secularists com­
prised the progressive side. Islamic symbols and values were defended and propagated 
under the ticket of nationalism. There was no mention of Islamism. The name given to the 
first important party with religious orientation, i.e., the NP, is a clear indication of that. 
The Turkish nationalists and “Islamists” so to speak, were using the same political ja r­
gon. One can even include the liberal-conservatives into the same categoiy given their 
rhetoric of “communist threat.”
To be sure, the identification of Islam with nationalism in those years is not without 
good reason. The Ottoman Empiie was a ghazi state preseiwing the unity and interests of 
the Muslim umma against the Christian West such that the word “Turk” has come to be
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identified with the word “Muslim” ·^'’“’^  'I'his interchangeability between the two distinct 
forms of identity can best be obsei'ved in the Muslim-populated provinces of the Balkan 
peninsula where “Turk” still means “Muslim”.
In any case, there was no differentiation at the level of political discourse between 
Islamists and nationalists until 1970s. Both groups were repre.sented in the conservative- 
center right parties, the DP and the .IP, respectively. The 1960s witnessed the emergence 
of ideological proliferation both in the left and right of the political spectrum thanks to the 
liberalization of politics brought about by the 1961 Constitution. In the proce.ss of transi­
tion from nationalism to overt Islamism^'’'’^  the NOP was founded by Necmettin Erbakan.
Interestingly enough, Erbakan explained the underlying reason for the establi.sh- 
ment of the NOP as the need to fill in the ideological vacuum created by the “JP ’s drift to 
the left’T^ \^ The NSP too, repre.sented the continuation of nationalist-conservative line at 
the time of its establishment In time, however, the NSP distanced itself from the nation­
alist polical discourse and began to use a more universal one under the impact of internal 
as well as external political conjuncture. The political response generated by the Arab- 
Israeli war of 1973 in the Muslim World as well as the active politico-military support 
given to Israel by the Western World paved the way for the deeply-rooted anti-Western 
feelings of the mas.ses to turn into concrete politico-economic sanctions in the form of us­
ing the oil “weapon” of the OPEC by the Arab members of the Organization against the 
West. The oil price hikes provided the Arab states for the first time with important politi­
cal leverage to be used against the oil-importing industrial countries. This state of affairs 
restored the Muslim self-confidence and feeling of pride, which had been subject to the 
continous western insults over three hundred years^"’®^ and hardly remained in existence. 
Thus, Erbakan came up with the proposal of an Islamic Common Market as the alterna­
tive equivalent of the Europaen Common Market which represents Christian interests. 
The desire to channel the Arab financial capital from Western banks to the financial insti­
tutions under the control of the Muslim countries as well as to distinguish his anti- 
westernism from that of the leftist anti-imperialism were the main factors leading Erbakan 
to adopt a more “Islamized” political di.scour.se.
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While these changes occurred as a consequence of external circumtances, anoth­
er domestic development had contributed in the making of the universalization process, 
namely, the establishment of the NAP as the representative of the Turkish nationalism 
distinct from the nationalism of the JP. Thus, the ideological posture of the NSP came to 
be based on a more universal line without, however, any important contribution of the 
N SP’s leadership. The followers of the NSP, accepted this new line without opposition. 
Yet, the universalization was more in apperance than in reality. I'he leadership of the Par­
ty was reluctant to establish ties with the Islamic movements in the Arab Middle East and 
Indian sub-continent at the ideological level, let alone collaboration at the action level^‘’'^ \
Toward the 1980s, under the impact of the Islamic reas.sertion witnessed all over 
the Muslim World as well as in Turkey, the NSP increasingly changed its nationalist or­
ientation and put more emphasis on the Islamic internationalism. The term “Muslims of 
Turkey” gained currency only in the late 1970s. To be sure, the NSP’s nationalism was 
drastically different from that of the NAP in the 1970s and had no ethnic or linguistic ref­
erence. As seen in the articulation of the NSP’s ideology under the nibric of the “National 
Outlook”, the NSP’s nationalism was distinctly Islamic and, in practical grounds, mani­
fested itself in the rejection of the Western cultural values and economic domination as 
well as a great nostalgy felt for the “glorious” imperial past. This new line was reflected 
in the NSP’s stand toward the 1979 revolution in Iran and the Islamization programme in­
itiated in Pakistan after the military takeover of 1977 led by the general Ziya-Ül Hak. The 
NSP welcomed the Islamic revolution in Iran and praised the steps taken toward the Is­
lamisation of social life in Pakistan^^’°\ It seems that the PP has a much clearer under­
standing of the Islamization policies pui sued in various parts of the Muslim World under 
different regimes, notably in the Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Accordingly, 
Erbakan expressed his views as follows;
“In some countries, certain steps were taken in bclialf of Islam, and .some aspects o f the Is­
lamic law were put into effect. Numeiri came to power in the Sudan and initiated an Islami- 
zation program by introducing some .sentences of the Islamic penal code. However, Islam 
does not consist of .some three articles of the penal code. If any state wishes to implement 
Islam, it should do this with a view of Islamization of every aspect of life. The implemen-
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Uilion of some articles of (lie Islamic penal code within a socio-political environment sub­
ject to exploitation and the “order of slavery" can not be construed as the implemenlalion of 
Islam. Ib is  is what has been happening in the .Sudan and Pakistan. In our conviction, today 
tliere is no country in the world where Islam in its entirety prevails and is in effect^^'\
Unlike the NSP, the PP and its leaders are well-known in tlie Muslim World thanks 
to the ties they have established with the other Islamic movements outside Turkey. This 
was clearly demonstrated iti the PP’s Third General Congress held on October 7, 1990, 
in which Erbakan re-elected as the chairman of the party. Many leading members and 
representatives of the Islamic orders and parties outside Turkey were invited to the Con­
gress. Among them were Abbas al-Medeni, the leader of the National Salvation Front in 
Algeria, Gulbeddin Hikmetyar and Burhaneddin Rabbani,.two leaders of the Afghan mu­
jahidin groups, the secretary-general of the Islamic Council, representatives of Cemaat-i 
Islami in Pakistan and the Federation of the World Muslim Students’ Organization along­
side the leader of the Islamic Party in Yugoslavia,— now, the president of the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzogovina, Ali İzzet Begovic. The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine 
(MAMAS), and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt also were represented in the Congress. 
'I'hus in a way, the PP’s Congress turned into a kind of the “ Islamic International’’ where 
the representatives of virtually all the Islamic movements in the World came together and 
established horizontal ties with one anotheP'’^ (
Erbakan’s efforts for peace prior to the Gulf war and his mediation for the resolu­
tion of the conflicts betveen various Afghan Islamic factions represented in the interim Af­
ghan goverment in exile earned him respect in the eyes of the members of the Islamic 
movements outside Turkey.
In the context of the new mission acquired by the PP, it has been suggested in the 
Islamic circles sympathetic to the PP that an Islamic International, similar to the Socialist 
International, must be founded in order to provide coordination and collaboration between 
the Islamic movements in the World^'’^  ^ Thus, the first-liand flow of information would 
be realized among them and the dialog between the Islamic parties all over the Muslim 
world would be achieved at the highest level.
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"We see politics as the totality of principles suggested 
as well as the method followed by a world-view in order to 
reach the status of the common values of humanity... Politics 
is the presentation of ideas. Its purpose is to carry those ide­
as into power. It aims at shaping not only the present but 
also the future. It is not determined and shaped according to 
the changing conditions. On the contrary, it tries to create an 
environment conducive for turning its world-view into the 
common values of humanity while simultaneously incorporat­
ing the exigencies of 'change'.”
—Ömer V. Hatipoğlu 
— Panel, (May-June, 1989)
3. “ISLAMIC MODERNISM” IN ACTION
A. The Ideological Posture of the NSP-PP Line
The PP, among the post-1983 parties in Turkey, is distinguished by its almost total 
sameness with its predecessore, the NSP, in terms of its ideological posture. The changes 
observed in its ideological line largely remained particular to the contextual level, far from 
being essential.
As noted in the la. t^ chapter, the PP is trying to establish more comprehensive ties, 
compared to the NSP, with’ the other Islamic formations in Turkey. The appearance of 
many periodicals, not political in content, proved to be influential in creating an intellectu­
al environment in which the PP received closer recognition. This “opening” and the con­
comitant cultural diversity provided the PP with the opportunity to tran.scend its relatively 
isolated position and to form an intellectual power base around itself. Paralel with that 
tliere has been an increasing concern for the avoidance of certain symbols, which had ad­
versely affected the image of the party, particularly in the eyes of those segments of the 
electorate who determine their voting behaviour independently of religious concerns. The 
need for a new-image building which would not estrange the “non-religious vote”, neces­
sitates the avoidance of the past mistakes responsible for the loss of confidence for the 
NSP which is expressed by a leading member of the PP as “the mobilisation for a new
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mission of self-expression and communication to people”^'\ The islamic reassertion of 
the 1980s, on the other hand, reflected itself in the increasing replacement of the party's 
posts by the younger generations, which may be a factor to further radicalize the Party's 
conciliatory stand^^\
Yet, it may safely be suggested that much remains the same in the ideological pos­
ture of the NSP-PP line, though one can observe a shift of emphasis in the political dis­
course of the PP as a consequence of the re-making of politics and the adoption of market 
economy after 1980 as well as the increasing manifestations of Islam in society, which 
brought the problems caused by the violation of human rights and a rising concern for the 
basic rights and liberties as well as the economic difficulties experienced by a large sec­
tion of society and worsening distribution of income^^^ to the forefront.
I. Question of Ideological Change
To a question if the “National Outlook” would be revised given the post-1980 re­
structurization of politics, Necmettin Erbakan replied:
“The National Outlook mentality is based on the basic principles. As a matter of fact, these 
basic principles are determined in accordance with human rights. They refer to the basic 
rights of state and citizen. In other words, they arc incorporated both in tlie old and new 
Constitutions. The National Outlook has always remained the same in terms of its funda­
mental principles. Its adoptation to the changing conditions, in this way or another, is out 
of question, bec.'iuse the.se are tlie principles Turkey will always need and can be applied re- 
gaidless of lime and place" '^'*.
Thus, “change” in ideological line has nothing to do with the essentials of the Na­
tional Outlook,to which “axiomatic certitude” “^’^  is ascribed. This resistance to change can 
be better understood when looked at from the vantage point of the primary source out of 
which the basic principles of the National Outlook are drawn, i.e., Islam. The National 
Outlook is a specific articulation of Islam by Necmettin Erbakan and his associates justi­
fied on the secular grounds because of the secular legal framework in which party politics
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has to operate. Yet, as tlie secretary-general of tlie PP, Oguzhan Asiltiirk, pointed out, the 
PP is clearer tiian the NSP in tenns of the unfolding of the National Outlook thanks to the 
more conducive political atmosphere of the 1980s generated by the Islamic reassertion in 
society^*’\  The NSP was extremely cautious in its stand toward the politico-legal system 
in Turkey due to the continous fear of being closed down. Therefore, it constantly em­
phasized its cpmmitment to the Constitution and espoused a highly cautious political dis­
course. The programme of the NSP was a clear reflection of that stand. While including
s with respect to sucli fields as economic problems, inter- 
gn policy, social justice and morals, it had rather general 
itical question^^\ This duality in approach, i.e., emphasis 
of commitment and loyalty to the system at the rhetorical level while tending to adopt an 
anti-systemic stand in practical grounds became a major feature of the NSP.
detailed suggestions and analys 
national relations, Turkish fore 
formulations regarding the pol
The increasing radicalization of the NSP in the late 1970s, though sporadic in its 
manifestations, is a clear indication of the fact that the NSP's allegiance to the system is 
due to “ tactical” reasons adopted to secure a safe and legitimate place within the system 
for itself. To be sure, the NSP’s radicalisation, in the final analysis, was with reference to 
the total rejection of the secular system rather than to the adoption of an ideological line 
cultivating the use of violence against the established order. In other words, the NSP was 
radical in its end, not in its means leading to that end.
The PP is not different from the NSP in paying lip service to the Constitution. Its 
programme embodies the claim that the PP is the only political party which repre.sents the 
essence of the Constitution truly and properly^’^ l This stand of the NSP-PP line is well- 
expressed in the following statement:
“Wc have no parly and .should nol have any. Tlie law forbids the organizalion of Muslims 
around a political party. To act in accordance with laws is our motto. The laws can be criti­
cized yet can nol be violated. It is forbidden to csl<iblish a political parly based on Islam.
Then, in order to make the spiritual character of the Turkish nation reigning, we need to 
pnx;ecd from center to periphery, nol vice versa"*' l^
In other words, the party politics for the NSP-PP line is a means for the expression
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of the National Outlook within the framework of legal constraints through a party pro­
gramme in order to attain political power. As a matter of fact, what is important for the 
NSP-PP line is to be in power. In the 1970s, the NSP had joined the RPP government of 
1974 as well as the following two National Front governments as one of the coalition 
partners; Wielding political power in those years furnished the NSP— a political party de­
riving its legitimacy from religion, which the Kemalist reforms had aimed at relegating to 
private realm, with political legitimacy, alongside the intrusion into the bureaucracy to 
fonn a centre of power to be used for long tenn gains. It does not make any difference for 
the NSP-PP line to enter into coalition with the parties of the centre-right or centre-left^'°\ 
This “ thirst for power” is well-captured in the First National Convention of the PP in 
1985 in the motto “At any rate, power!” As Hasan Aksay, the editor-in-chief of Milli Ga- 
zete— the semi-official daily of the PP, put it “It is imperative for the PP to come into 
power in order to put an end to eviIs,profiteering and plundering...”P 9. Thus there is no 
point in remaining in opposition for the PP.
In the course of the modernization process in Turkey, the NSP represents a eounter 
breakthrough in the making of the religious opposition with its independent soeio- 
economic power base as well as the political elites, which formed “a second centre”9^  ^
against the secular intellectual-bureaucratic elites for the first time in the history of the Re­
public. With this new intra-elite cleavage, the NSP managed to garner the votes of those 
segments of society which have been alienated by the Kemalist center in social as well as 
political terms9'’\
An important novelty brought about by the NSP-PP line in this respect is to forge 
an equation between the religious identity of Muslims and their political preferences. To 
establish such a paralel between the Muslim faith and voting behaviour oriented the Mus­
lims who had voted for the centre right parties until the establishment of the NSP towai’d 
voting along the lines (allegedly) consistent with their Islamic identity^^ in this contex, 
it must be noted that one of the basic aims of the official Islamisation polices pursued un­
der the military administration of 1980-1983 aiid the following MP government was to 
disconnect the relationship between political preferences and religious convictions, i.e., 
the “politici.sation of religion.”
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II. Ideological Basis of the National Outlook
As to the ideology of the NSP-PP line, named the National outlook, it embodies “a 
mixture of religious and non-religious themes” '^-‘’\  It is a combination of Islamic tradition 
and modernism. Its developmentalist orientation reflects the heavy influence of progressi- 
vist-developmentalist philosophy of the Englighlenrnent such that its discourse regarding 
cultural and spiritual matters is expressed through the developmentalist jargon, as reflect­
ed in the motto of “spiritual development”. Interestingly enough, the name of the present 
party of the National Outlook, the PP, again is borrowed from the conceptual framework 
of the developmantalist ideology^'^’\
Erbakan and his associates had engaged in politics within the JP and other rightist 
parties and organisations. Their mental sources and material connections moulded their 
mind into an interesting synthesis of the traditional sunni-based Islamic culture and sufi 
world-view embedded within a developmcntalist discourse. From the beginning, their po­
litical party programme, presented as the “National Outlook”, were marked by a sense of 
historical heroism, or better “ the adoration for the glorious past” as Algar put it,d^^ a na­
tionalist-conservative socio-political attitude and a pro-industrialization economic philoso­
phy.
The ideological theses of the NSP-PP line are a product of the combination of a tra­
ditionalist discourse and rationalist-positivist conception of .science and technology. The 
programs and platforms of both the NSP and PP contain views and evaluations to the ef­
fect that the Turkish nation has undergone a deep-rooted degeneration moral wise due to 
the emulation of the western way of life, that the reason for the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire was this mockery, that to regain our historical greatness is bound to attach proper 
importance to “spiritual development”, that the interest-based and consumption-oriented 
understanding of industrialization dictated by what one can call “cola-colanization”, 
speaking through the third world Jargon, has paralysized the national economy and that 
the road to economic growth passes through the realization of the “Heavy Industry Ef­
fort”.
This conceptualization is the reminiscent of the ideological posture of the Islamists 
in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, which espoused an eclectic attitude toward the
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West such that they advocated the reception of the western science and technology while 
preserving the indigeneous cultural roots and civilization in order to close the develop­
mental gap between the West and tlie Ottoman Empire. As Toprak obseiwed, the protec­
tion of society against immoral and decadent insults of the West is a common theme to be 
found in all nationalist-con.sei'vative formulations of modernizations'll
Thus, according to the NSP-PP line, westernization is the western model of moder­
nity. It is based on and shaped by the interests and cultural patterns of the West. Accord­
ingly, one can talk of Soviet or Chinese models of modernity. In other words, moderni­
zation process is culture-spesific and hence the modernization experience of a certain 
nation can not be generalized over other nations. While distinguishing modernisation 
froni westernisation and accepting the necessity of the creation of modernity along nation­
al lines, the NSP-PP line sees the exploitation and domination of the Muslim world by 
western industrial powers as the main cause of the economic backwardness of the Muslim 
umma. It sees industrialization in line with the dependency perspective as the only way to 
break the chains of the international division of labor imposed by the world capitalist sys­
tem and to gain politico-economic independence"^l Again, the import substitution indus­
trialization (ISl) strategy is conceived to be a counter revolutionary strategy of economic 
growth which would end the dependency of the third world and naturally, in NSP-PP 
case, of the Muslim world. The famous “Heavy Industry Effort” of the NSP when it was 
in power in the 1970s was a manifestation of this line of thought. In order to better under­
stand the commitment of the NSP-PP line to industrialization “almost with a religious 
zeaP’^ '^^ l one need to analyze the context in which it is taken up as well as policies sug­
gested for the solution of the problem.
III. The National Outlook and the Question of Industrialization
According to the National Outlook, industrialization is a “matter of life and death” It 
is the major factor in gaining economic independence and political superiority. This is 
why the non-industrialized, “less developed” countries of the third world have been sub­
ject to the domination of the industrialized countries^^'l
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In this context, for the NSP-PP line, the question of industrialization is a matter 
with both materia] and spiritual dimensions. Because man is created with materia! as well 
as spiritual dispositions and becau.se he occupies a central place in every human effort, an 
industrialization process without a spiritual dimension is incomplete. Accordingly, the re­
alization of industrialization with a human side, according to the National Outlook, is 
closely related to the type of economic order adopted. In this re.spect, both capitalism and 
communism are inhumane strategies of economic growth. Both are the same in nature. 
They compartmentalize the human existence into two separate world, material and spiritu­
al. Both are materialist and consider exploitation legitimate in tenns of their cultures and 
interests^ ^^ \
According to Erbakan, humanity has been and is under the oppression of the west­
ern civilisation for three centuries, which takes to the view that “might is right”. This op­
pression is enforced through the two tools of the World Zionism: capitalism and commu­
nism. Both of these views are based on the mentality which considers power superior to 
right and justice. Therefore, both are the orders of the “oppressed and the oppressor” . 
The only difference between them is that the oppressor in communist order is the state it­
self while in capitalist order it is the capitalist class. Both of them foster inaterial develop­
ment at the expense of spiritual satisfaction^^-^l
Then, all the models of economic growth which does not take to the motto “First 
morals and spirituality” is wrong. Islam, however, has its own unique economic order 
distinct from both capitalism and communism. It takes the needs of both society and indi­
vidual into consideration. It envisages a “man of morals” rather than “homo economics” 
of the liberal ideology. The balanced mentality of Islam considers private ownership and 
profit legitimate while charging Muslims with the responsibility of being productive. 
There is no room for wasting and interest, as is the ca.se in capitalism. In short, Islam is 
free from the weaknesses of both .system^ '^h.
IV. The “Just Economic Order” of the PP
In the 1980s, it .seems that the policy-makers of the PP elaborated on the economic 
ideology of the National Outlook and turned it into a more comprehensive and coherent
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economic programme, called the “Just Economic Order.“ The emphasis on justice reflects 
both the party’s sensitivity to the worsening socio-economic conditions of the popular 
.sector, comprising lower and lower-midle clas-ses, and at the same time its conception of 
“right”, which refu.ses tlie western conception of “might is right”.
According to Erbakan and other leaders of the party, in the western context, “pow­
er” , “majority principle”, “privilege” and “interest” are the four sources leading to the 
emergence of “I'ights” . This understanding fosters the perpetuation of oppression in the 
world. In the order which would bring happiness to humanity, “right” is thought to 
emerge in the following cases : 1) The basic rights granted to man by birth: These are the 
right to live; the right to believe, the right to property and the right to protect one’s own 
intellect, belief and family; 2) The rights caused by labour, 3) The rights emerged from 
voluntary contracts, and 4) The rights necessitated by the sense of justice. It is essential 
for the peace and happiness of humanity to rule in accordance with the understanding fa­
voring the prevalence of “right” and justice^^·“’^
According to the economic model of the National Outlook, industrialization is only 
the material side of the Just Economic Order. In other words, industrialization and materi­
al development refer to the same phenemenon. In this respect, in order to attain a satisfac­
tory level of industrialization, the Just Economic Order suggests a number of basic princi­
ples. In the first place, wasting should be ended. The wrong economic priorities, such as 
the channeling of resources to tourism sector is included in the definition of wasting. All 
the taxes and funds are to be abolished. State should finance its expenditures through 
revenues obtained from its, active contribution to production process. Policies with respect 
to taxes were increasingly given a radical nature such that in the 1970s, the NSP advocat­
ed the arrangement of taxes in accordance with the principle of equity. Thus, taxes should 
be imposed on capital and wealth, not on profits. But now, it is for the total abolishment 
of taxes and govermental funds. The credit system in the Just Economic Order would be 
restructured so as to prevent the injustices in the distribution of credits which presently fa­
vors th.e rich over the poor. There would be no such thing as the “compression” of the 
popular sector and injust income differentials caused by the high interest rates and im­
proper distribution of credits. Most important of all, the interest would be abolished,
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wliich makCvS the rich riclier and the poor poorer and hence gives rise to socio-political un­
rest.
As is seen, the most radical measure deemed to be es,sential in the Just Economic 
Order is the abolishment of interest. According to the National Outlook this is the key to 
the social peace and justice^^^’\  Interest-free banking based on “profit-sharing” is suggest­
ed as the alternative to the present banking .system. Yet, Erbakan sees the financial institu­
tions presently operating on interest-free principles in Turkey as only the first step toward 
the realization of the interest-free banking system of the Just Economic Order^^^\
The Just Economic Order aims at social justice and increasing prosperity, it claims 
to be the alternative to the usurious capitalist system, which destroys the economy and su- 
perexploites the people through its five “microbes”: interest, injust taxes, the issuance of 
money not niatched in production, floating exchange rate sistem and credit system. All 
these “microbes” work against workers, farmers, civil seivants, artisans and other lower 
income groups. They sc’-ve only the interests of a very small “collaborationist” minority. 
Inflation, unemployment, heavy co.sts of living and all the re.st of it, coupled with the bad 
income distribution drag the country into the atmosphere of social and political unrest. 
Besides, this “Econoinic Order of Slavery”, as Erbakan put it, accelerates moral deca­
dence on the part of both the rich and the poor.
In the present “Economic Order of Slavery”, the 92 percent of what one earns is 
taken away from him and only 8 percent stays with him. In the Just Economic Order, 
however, every person will earn twelwe times more than one earns now. How? In the 
present order, one third of the cost of production is accounted by interest. Another one 
third consist of government taxes. Thus, when interest and taxes are removed from the 
costs of the production, the prices would fall into one-third of the present level. In other 
words, with the same working capital, the production would inciease more than three 
times and this would create three-fold employment capacity than before. This is the solu­
tion envisaged for the unemployment question. Because there would be no tax and inter­
est among the cost items, the cost of production will get cheaper and this would lead to an 
export boom, in the real sen.se of the word. Also, the market question for the export
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goods would be resolved through the establishment of a common market with the Muslim 
countries^ '^^ l
The new Just Economic Order can be analysized at five levels :
/. General Principles:
These principles define the general features of the order. The first one is the “hori­
zontal etiitism”. That is, the role of state in economy would be to prepare macro plans and 
guide the general course of the economy. The state would be responsible for infrastruc­
ture and not involved actively in the production process. It would secure the coordination 
between eeonomie enterpri,ses. The second principle is the conduet of economic activities 
in the production and distribution process through private sector. The “diffused private 
sector” conceived as a joint-stock company having at least one hundred shareholders, 
each of whom holding no more than 5 per cent of the total shares and supported by the in­
terest-free loans of the state would be instiumental in the realization of “national”, “pow- 
eiful”, “rapid” and “widespread” industrialization^^'^\ In this context, the driving force in 
the development efforts would not be the “happy minority” of liberal capitalism or the 
state as suggested by the leftist view. This role would be undertaken by the “Regional De­
velopment Companies”^^ '’^
The determination of prices in the market as well as the ascription of the main eco­
nomic activities to the private sector brings with it the question if the “Just Economic Or­
der” (JEO) of the National Outlook is different from capitalism in its essentials. Accord­
ing to Erbakan, you can play both chess and draught on the same board. That board can 
be converted into a chess or draught-board in line with the prescribed rules of the game. 
The difference is in the changing rules of the game. Similarly, free market can operate 
both in accordance with capitalism and the Just Economic Order^^'l In other words, the 
“invisible hand of the market” is equally responsive to both. To take “free market” as the 
“given variable” has nothing to do with liberal capitalism.
2. Monetary Policy:
The so-called “economic question” is the enourmous gap between the productive 
capacity of man and his infinite wishes and desires. Thus, what is to be done is to forge a
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balance between production and consumption through restricting the “right to consume” 
according to one's contribution to the economic production. In the JEO, money is the 
measure of the exchange value between production and consumption. It is not a good in 
itself. It is a unit of measurement. It shows how much one can consume in accordance 
with the value of one's contribution to production. Therefore, in the JEO, the amount of 
money issued is equal to the amount of goods and services produced in economy. The 
extra-issuance of money is only for the renewal of the worn-out paper monies.
Interest on money would be abolished, for this is the recognition of consumption 
right unjustly to those who do not contribute in the production process. It is a means of 
exploitation and hence unless it is abolished, the Just Economic Order can not be estab­
lished. In the last analysis, interest is a Zionist tax levied by the Zionist banks, which sus­
tains the present “Economic Order of Slavery”.
The policy of fixed exchange rate would be adapted, and because under the JEO 
th.ere would be no issuance of money exceeding the production limits, inflation would 
disappear without any difficulty^^^\
3. Crexlit Policy:
Banks would be owned by the state. Yet, private banks can be established as well. 
In the new JEO, banks would provide seven kind of credits free of interest needed by en­
trepreneurs among which are, credit resources created through the joining of capital on 
the basis of profit-sharing the credits based on the acquired rights principle, credits in ex­
change of labour, investment credits and the like^ -^^ \
4. Fiscal Policy:
The state can not levy any tax on unilateral basis. In order to levy taxes, the state 
should produce the équivalant amount of goods or services. In the new JEO, all taxes 
would be abolished and the state can not tax any person or any company. The share of the 
state in the production under the JEO would be one- fifth of the total. The state revenues 
would be obtained from the state's contribution to the general production. The right to tax 
is related to one of the basic rights of man, i.e., the right to property. Therefore, no politi­
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cal body, including the National Assembly can not set taxes. The tax limits should be de­
termined by the Constitution^^''l
5. Social Security Policy:
The Just Economic Order would ensure universal social security funded by govern­
ment resources. In fact, social solidarity is a natural corollary of the type of relations that 
the National Outlook aspires, i.e., the wann and humane atmosphere of “communitarian” 
social existence, which would end the atomization brought about by “mass society”. The 
altruistic character of human relations would create a work ethics and communal responsi­
bility such that it would ti igger economic development which is essential in regaining his­
torical greataess'-^^l
V. The National Outlook and the Education System
To be sure, in the creation of an industrial society with “pre-modern” values, the 
adoption of a creative educational policy is crucial. The education policy should empha­
size the national-moral values on the one hand, and give priority to creative works rather 
than the imitation of western culture and technology,^^^’^  on the other. Regarding educa­
tional policy, the PP suggests the “Just Order of Science” and the “Just Order of Morals”
(37)_
Thus, the creation of an appropriate socio-cultural millieu for the spiritual and mate­
rial development of children is imperative in raising the new generations free from the 
“ imitative mentality” of the fonner generations^^*'\ In this regard, the western cultural per­
missiveness inculcated into the youth through education is responsible for the moral deca­
dence and corruptness of Turkish society, manifested in the western style of wearing, 
TV, movie and theatre programs detrimental to the national values and the increasingly 
weakening family ties^^‘^ l According to the National Outlook, dedication to moral values 
and to the supremacy of just rule in the sense of the Islamic conception of what is right, 
are the central concepts around which society should be restructured.
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VI. The NSP-PP Line and the Turkish Political System
The renewal of “nomenclatura” in the political discourse of the PP can be observed 
in its approach to the present political regime as well. According to PP, an Economic Or­
der of Slavery has been implemented in Turkey through “modern imperialism” by the 
world imperialist and Zionist powers. The persistence of this “Order of Slavery” has been 
made possible through the enforcement of a regime o f /‘repression and deception”. The 
deceptive character of the political rejime is an inevitable corollary of the “Economic Order 
of Slavery”.
According to Erbakan, there is no overlapping between the rights and liberties as 
recognized in the Constitution and in their manner of implementation in practice. The 
whole political business is just another case of “everybody is equal, but some are more 
equal” situation* '^’”\  Although the Constitution pre.scribes that Turkey is a democratic 
state, the practical appearance of this is a “guided democracy”. Again, according to the 
Constitution, Turkey is a secular state. In practice, however, this is understood as the 
“right to oppress Muslims”. Political independence is one of the basic principles laid 
down in the Constitution. Yet, Turkey's application to the European Community for full 
membership will lead to the suspention of that principle.
In short, the present political regime, in line with the requirements of the present ec­
onomic order, is a regime of deception. And, as long as Turkey remains in the western 
sphere of influence, the possibility of the establishment of a “real” democratic order will 
not be materialized. In order to sustain this state of affairs, many articles in violation of 
basic human rights are inserted into the Political Parties Law, Election Law and the like
(4I)_
The PP suggests the “Just Political Order” as the “cure” for the prevailing “regime 
of deception.” Thus, in the first place, a national Constitution should be made free from 
“outside influences”, which would eliminate the obstacles to the freedom of belief and 
thought and at the same time would represent a valid social contract among different 
groups in society. As Erbakan put it “In our Just Political Order, everybody has the right 
to live in accordance with his b e l i e f s I n  case that no comprimise is arrived at among
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societal forces, Erbakan asserts that everyone should be given the right to live as he sees 
proper. This “anarchical stand” connotes the idea of “distinct islands of social existence“, 
which is not too different from civil society discourse, particularly regarding the role of 
state.
According to Erbakan, democracy is not an end but a means. The end is the estab­
lishment of a just and prosperous order. If the democratic process in practice tunis into a 
tyrannical order, it will lose its egalitarian spirit. Therefore, in the Just Political Order, 
every alternative, including those espoused by the iip.itators of the “Western Club”, would 
be presented under c(|ual conditions to the masses. The Constitution would preserve the 
human rights as well as restrict the political power so as to prevent the oppression by the 
state. A peaceful environment of political as well as cultural pluralism would secure the 
coexistence of different ways of life. Although there is not much clarity about the extent 
of the pluralism envisaged to prevail in the Just Political Order of the PP, Erbakan sees no 
problem in placing his approach* beside that of the “civil society project” , which has 
gained increasing recognition in certain .secular intellectual circles in recent years '^^^l
For the NSP-PP line, the political spectrum in Turkey consists of two poles: The 
National Outlook and other views espoused by what Erbakan once called the “members 
of the Western Club“ . The National outlook is being represented by the PP, while the 
views derivative of “Western Outlook“ are presently represented by the MP, the True 
Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, TPP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SDPPj^'’'’^  The PP rejects the right-left cleavage on the ground 
that it is a reflection of functional and ideological cleavages into the political spectrum, 
which are given birth to in the materialist societies, and therefore sees itself outside this 
classification. As a matter of fact, the so-called leftist or rightist parties are the representa­
tive of the different versions of the capitalist order. They are the creations of a seemingly 
pluralist understanding, based on western cultural monism. Thanks to various social and 
psychological factors, the parties which are the close replica of one another in terms of 
their aims and programmes are pre.sented as different political formations. A nation, 
which has never been materialist throughout its history, can not be casted in these terms. 
Tlierefore, the PP considers the prevalence of the “National Outlook” as its primaiy goab'^’^
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The views and policies formulated by Erbakan under the rubrics of “national- 
spiritual development” and tlie National Outlook,—given the legal and constitutional re­
straints which force the NSP-PP line to enter a “symbolic dialoge” '^*^’^  with its political 
clienteles, is generally understood as the only way out to represent the Islamic ideology 
within the legal framework in the eyes of its followers. Therefore, the removal of those 
articles scattered in different laws which forbid the politicisation of religion and especially 
the article 163 of the penal code were of prime importance to the NSP. The same empha­
sis continued with the PP. Yet, when the article 163 of the Penal Code was aboli,shed by 
the Law for Struggle Against Terror in April 1991, this has not brought about any change 
in the PP’s political discourse. The “duality in approach” inherited from the NSP has lin­
gered on. When asked if there would occur any change in the programme of the PP given 
the abolisltment of the article 163, Erbakan stated that since the Law on the Organisation 
of Political Parties remains intact, an Islamist Party can not be founded on legal grounds 
and claimed that the freedom of thought and conscious can not be fully recognized by the 
western-oriented present political parties, for, in that case, the imperialism, which dictates 
its commands to those parties, can not sustain its exploiUition secured by the present Eco­
nomic Order of Slavcry^''^^ This state of affairs is also a clear indication of “deceptive and 
repressive“ character of the present political order. What all this amounts to is that the 
elimination of the “order of exploitation” and the recognition of the freedom of thought 
and concious can only be possible when the PP come into power.
Accordingly, it can be suggested that the PP will continue to justify itself on the 
secular grounds, as the NSP did, becau.se it prefers playing the political game according 
to the rules determined outside its will to withdrawing from it at the expense of the dis­
ruption of its political discourse. This pragmatism, however, is counteracted by a rigid 
stand toward change in ideological lines '^’*^\
Tlie NSP-PP line has avoided to take a clear stance with regard to “problematic” is­
sues and deemed those issues as if inexistant. Of course, the main reason for the adoption 
of such a line is that the NSP-PP line operates within the system without being identified 
with it because of its allegiance to cautiously disguised Islamic justification ground. Re­
garding the issue of Ataturkism, for example, the PP keeps silent and put itself outside
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the discusvsions concerned at the level of its official discourse. AsiltUrk, the secretary- 
general of the PP, explains this stance as follows:
“Everybody is AlaUirkisI in Turkey... All (lie groups wlio hold opposile views to Alaturk- 
ism have disgiii.sed (heir actual ideological oricn(a(ion by prclending (o be (he real Atatur- 
kis(. In (Iiis connection, we ;ue re.soivcd not to exploit Ataturkism and hence determine our 
Ix)si(ion accordingly’·^ '*'^ ^
Althougli, in 1989 the PP's mayor of Urfa province publicly declared that “I’m nei­
ther secular nor Atatui kist ”, an indication of the potantial for radicalization particularly 
strong among the lower ranks of tlie party, nevertheless, this does not denote a departure 
from the traditional cautious line sand remained at the level of “personal explosion”.
VII. The NSP-PP Line and the Turkish Foreign Policy
Contrary to the pragmatic and moderate orientation dominating its official rhetoric, 
the NSP-PP line is quite vocal and, in a way, rather radical in its gra.sp of Turkish For­
eign Policy within the international context. The conceptualization of the relations be­
tween the Muslitn World and the West and, in that connection, the making of Turkish 
Foreign Policy, centre around the idea of the “zionist plot for the world domination”. Ac­
cording to Erbakan, in the World Zionist Congress of 1897 in Ba.sel, a three-phase strate­
gy was adopted. I'he finst phase was the founding of an independent Jewish state in Pal­
estine. This aim was niaterihlized with the establishment of Israel in 1948. The second 
phase was the realization of the Great Israel extending frotn the Nile river to the South- 
East Anatolia. The occupation of Arab lands and the rendering of the holy Jeru.salem the 
eternal capital city of Israel point to this aspiration. Turkey's entrance into the European 
Cotnmunity (EC) is another iniportant step of this phase. This would incorporate Turkey 
to Israel in that Israel too would be a full member of the EC following Turkey's member­
ship. The thiid phase is the Zionist World dotnination through the elimination of Islam 
frotn all over the woiid^‘’”\
The Zionist connection shed lights on the westernization process of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Turkish Republic. By means of westernization, the National Outlook has
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been taken away from our nation and its creative mind was replaced by an “imitative spir­
it“ . The scientists and the learned man of a nation can not produce original works by 
wasting time with the translations of foreign works. The indu.strialization efforts are con­
fined to the production of light consumer goods. This was the first phase of the estrange­
ment of the Turkish nation from the National Outlook. The second phase was that of ex­
ploitation. In this pha.se, economic and cultural imperialism have been intensified . The 
third pha.se will end up with the loss of independence, which corresponds to Turkey's en­
trance into the EC. The fourth and last phase, is the disappearence from the international 
.scene of national exislence*-’' \
Beginning with the 1970s, the NSP vehemently criticized Turkey's efforts toward 
integration with European Common Market (EEC), mainly because of the above- 
described ideological and political rea.sons. Unlike .some leftist circles who opposed Tur­
key's entrance into the Common Market due to economical reasons, the main factors in 
the NSP's opposition to the EEC were cultural and ideological ones.
In the political context of the 1980s, the leaders of the PP found a direct connection 
between the Islamic reas.sertion in Turkey and Turkey's application to the European Com­
munity for the full membership in 1987. To the PP, Turkey's application in question is an 
attempt by the West to take the Islamic reassertion in Turkey and the world under its con- 
troi('’2) 'Plie NSP-PP line .sees the membership to the EC as submission to the crusaders 
by way of forming a joint government, a collective army, a common unit of currency and 
a joint assembly under a joint political leadership In this .sen.se, membership to the EC 
represents a betrayal against our historical mission, conception of civilization and culture 
as well as our independence. It is the last chain of the westernization process and the de­
nial of our Muslim identity. The Weltanschauung underlying the “Christian club” called 
the EC and the National Outlook are diastically opposite. Therefore, the coexistence of 
them is out of question.
Yet, despite the strong opposition to Turkey's full membership to the EC, the NSP- 
PP line is not against collaboration with the West. Unless they do not take the form of 
“master-servant“ type relation, all sorts of commercial, military or otherwise connections
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with the West embody no risks and are to the mutual benefits of the parties concerned^^‘’\
At a more general level, according to the National Outlook, the basic ends of the 
Turkish Foreign Policy should be 1) “an honourable foreign policy”; 2) “the preservation 
of the national rights and”, 3) “Turkey being a leader state, not a satellite!” In the chang­
ing conjuncture of the international environment caused by the dissolution of the commu­
nist world, humanity is after a new system, which can only be met by the Just Order of­
fered by the National Outlook. To achieve this, the Just Order first should be established 
in Turkey. In the process, all sorts of ties should be forged with the Muslim countries in 
the world at all levels. In this context, a Muslim United Nation, as an alternative to the 
UN, which is under the western domination, a Muslim Economic Community (instead of 
the EC), with an Islamic Dinar as a common unit of currency, and a Muslim version of 
the NATO and of UNESCO must be created ·^*’'"’^  This would put the Muslim world in a 
powerful position against World Zionism and imperialism. Becau.se the Just Order would 
constitute the mainstay of this new formation, its purpose would be to secure the happi­
ness of all humanity, not exploitation . Therefore, the relations between the Muslim world 
and the industrialized western countries as well as the “developing” countries would be 
characterized by mutual friendship and understanding. Incidentally, while the NSP ap­
proved Turkey's NATO membership in the context of the cold war, the PP's attitude to­
ward NATO seems to be getting negative after the breakdown of the Warsaw pact, as re­
flected in the party's opposition to Turkey's involvement in the Gulf war^ ^^ ’^
According to Erbakan, in the new international context emerged after the dissolution 
of the communist system and the inability of capitalism to remedy the social problems 
caused by it, the agenda of Turkey should be made up of the following matters; 1) to 
stop the devastation caused by the political parties caught up with the “ imitative spirit” 
since the transition to multi-party system. The most important and large-scale harm has 
been done in the fields of morals and spirituality; 2) to produce solutions to such prob­
lems as inflation, unemployment, and increasing concentration of income brought about 
by the present Economic Order of Slavery; 3) to replace the present political regime of 
“repression and deception”, which is the main barrier before the freedom of thought and 
conscience, with the Just Political Order of the National Outlook; 4) to prevent the “Com­
mon Market disaster”, for it will end up with the loss of independence of Turkey^-^’\
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B. Political Discourse of the NSP-PP Line
Drawing upon the press conferences of Erbakan held during 1990, it can be claimed 
that the political discourse of the PP has not drastically changed compared to that of the 
NSP. In a content analysis of the Party's semi-official daily, Milli Gazete, Alkan found 
that “while strictly religious subjects became less prominent in Erbakan's speeches be­
tween 1973 and 1980, non-religious ones gained increasing importance”^^ '*k Of the eight 
subjects that received less attention, according to Alkan, only two (‘Industrialization and 
Social Policy’) do not seem to be connected with religion. While the categories “Relig­
ion”; “Moral Development, Morals, Spiritual Beliefs”; and “Secularism” are directly relat­
ed to religion, the remaining three are only indirectly related: “Liberties, Human Rights, 
Democracy”; “Cultural, Historical and Ethnocentric Issues”; and “Education”. By con­
trast, none of the seven categories showing increased importance are directly related to re­
ligion. These categories are: “Foreign Policy”; “Economy in G eneral”; “Terrorism”; 
“High Cost of living”; “Anti-Semitism, “Zionism”; “Westernization, Western Club, Cul- 
trual Alienation”; and “Bureaucracy, Public Administration”. Out of these seven catego­
ries, only two of them “Anti-Semitism, Zionism”; and “Westernization, Western Club, 
Cultural Alienation“ plus ohe subcategory of “Foreign Policy” (“Relations with Muslim 
Countries”) are indirectly related^ ·*’'^  ^ The other subcategories of Foreign Policy in Erba­
kan's Speeches are composed of “Foreign Policy in General”; “Cyprus”; and “Common 
Market”. As Alkan obseiwed:
“The decreasing imporlance of religion in Erbakan's relhorie docs not nece.ssarily indicate 
that lc.ss significance was given to religion in his or party's ideology .... (In fact) religious 
militancy became more pronounced over time... the cmhasis on religion in 1973 may have 
emerged from a need to delineate the ideological identity of the N,SP. Once this has been 
achieved, however, day-to-day politics apparently pushed religious issues to the back- 
ground"^ ’^^ .^
Among the issues dominating the political rhetoric of Erbakan in the 1980s, howev­
er, “religious ones”, as Alkan put it, have received increasing emphasis in line with the 
overall more “Islamized” political context^'^'l Such issues categorized in Alkan's study as
— 7 6 —
“Liberties, Human rights and Democracy”,— in this respect the party dwelled upon the 
abolishment of the article 163, and though somewhat reluctantly, the articles 141-142 of 
the Penal Code, the ban on wearing of headscarf by female Muslim students alongside the 
“sporadic” dismissal of Islamists from the ranks of the civil-military bureaucracy; “Anti- 
Zionism”; “W esternization”; and above all, the political developments in the Muslim 
world and Turkey's relations with Muslim countries may be considered as the indications 
of this.
The press conferences of Erbakan held during 1990 generally composed of two 
sections: 1) The Developments in the World; 2) The Developments at Home. Under the 
.section of the “Developments in the World”, Erbakan treated exclusively the political 
problems faced by the Muslims all over the world: from the Moro muslims struggling for 
political independence in Philippine to the Indian Muslims in Kashmir struggling for the 
same aim; from the Muslims in Ethiopia to the Palestine and Afghanistan questions. The 
developments outside tlie Muslim World, to Erbakan, consists of the systemic vacuum 
emerged with the breakdown of the communist World whicii points to the urgent need for 
a new paradigm at the systemic level, i.e., “the Just Order” of the National Outlook.
I'he “Developments at Home” section was composed of the evaluation of the elec­
tion results and if there was no election, the issues regarding Turkish Foreign Policy in 
general, the relations with the European Community and Muslim countries plus the USA. 
The “standard agenda” comprised the issues related to the political freedoms of the Mus­
lims— a theme that was touched upon in all of those conferences*'’^ ^
Yet, the emphasis on religion by the PP has been overwhelmed by the party’s ap­
peal for social welfare and social justice*'’^ \ The 1980s have been the years, for the popu­
lar sector, of the increasingly worsening living conditions. The share of that sector in the 
total GNP was badly affected from the measures taken to reorient the economy toward the 
world markets. Unemployment persisted. Industrialization came to a standstill. The infla­
tion drastically increased the costs of living. For the first time in the Republican history, a 
rentier class was created. Accordingly, while the share of wage earners in the GNP de­
creased, those of profit, interest and rent reached unprecedented levels. Besides, the bar­
-77—
gaining power of tlie trade unions was severely limited by the labor laws enacted during 
the military rule of 1980-1983. All these exacerbated the alienation of large sections of the 
popular class from the iiiling MP, which has been the champion of “neo-liberalism”.
Against this background, a corresponding shift of emphasis has taken place in the 
PP's discourse. In one of the party's pamphlet, titled “Türkiye'nin Gerçek Durumu: Seb­
epleri Teşhis” (The Real Situation of Turkey: The Diagnosis of The Causes), the “symp­
toms” of the illnesses suffered by the “man in the street” were suggested to be “high costs 
of living, poverty, misery, hunger, unemployment, bribery, inequality of opportunity, 
backwardness in terms of living conditions, the unjust distribution of income, exploita­
tion, oppression, injustices, inflation, the increasing worsening of day-to-day living con­
ditions and moral decadence manifested in the increase in the number of mentaly-afflicted 
patients, divorce and suicide”^^’'’^  In view of such an “unjust” situation, the PP has come 
up with its alternative economic programme called the Just Economic Order promising 
justice and prosperity. 'I hus, one can see a paralel shift in the slogans and agitation motifs 
of the PP such as “Prices are on the European standards; the wages a tenth of it” and “A 
Turkey working and earning, not sitting and silenced”.
The changing profile of the PP in contrast to the NSP in terms of its political dis­
course and agitation motifs led some observers of the Turkish politics to conclude that 
this state of affairs may well be the signs of a probable shift in the electoral base of the 
PP, which now is attempting to reach civil servants and workers as potential party sup- 
porters^^’·’^  In the absence of survey data, it is difficult to substantiate this thesis. Yet, it 
can be concluded that if there has been such a change in the profile of the PP's support 
base, this points to the fact that the small merchants, traders, shopkeepers and artisans, 
which generally thought to constitute the core of the defunct NSP's power base by the 
students of Turkish politics, despite the absence of any survey data indicating such a con­
nection, are no longer the backbone of the clienteles of the NSP-PP line^'^\
To conclude, at the end of its twenty years, the basic contours of the ideological or­
ientation of the NSP-PP line seetns to have remained the same. Nevertheless, because it 
has been casted within a highly populistic and pragmatic di.scourse, the new dynamics 
and formations brought about by the changing socio- political environment of the 1980s 
have been, to some extent, articulated into the political discourse of the PP.
- 7 8 -
C. The NSP-PP Line and the Electoral Competition
I. Organizational Network of the NSP-PP Line
The organizational network of the PP, like its predecessor, NSP, is an important 
factor in the party's political appeal. Alongside the official party branches organized along 
vertical lines, there are also a number of organizations that the PP has horizontal, though 
informal, ties. Although the party does not have the equivalent of the pre-1980 youth or­
ganization (Akıncılar), which was the action-oriented arms of the NSP, it has managed to 
socialize part of the youth into the National Outlook through the branches of the Founda­
tion of the National Youth (Milli Gençlik Vakfı), scattered all over the country. Since the 
Law for the Organisation of Party Politics pas.sed in 1983 has banned for the political par­
ties to establish youth and women branches as well as any organizational ties with other 
interest group associations, there emerged an informal network of organizations that has 
close ties with political parties. Accordingly, the PP too has establi,shed indirect contacts 
with the Association of the Voice of Women (Hanımların Sesi Derneği), unlike the NSP 
which did not have any women's association. I ’he Hak-Îş Confederation,— a trade union 
affiliated with the NSP, which founded in 1976, has been the only union alongside the 
Turk-Iş Confederation that continued its activities after the military coup of the September 
12, 1980. The Association of the Basic Rights and Liberties (Temel Haklar ve Hürriyetler 
Derneği) and The Writer's Union of Turkey (Türkiye Yazarlar Birliği) can be cited, 
among others, as the associations affiliated with the PP. The migrant Turkish workers in 
Germany who are members of the Organisations of the National Outlook in Germany 
(Milli Görüş Almanya Teşkilatları) has provided the PP with financial help as well as vol­
untaries who visited Turkey during elections in order to propagate the party's views in the 
campaign.
II. Electoral Support Base of the NSP
It is generally alleged that the NSP has been supported mainly by the marginal 
groups in Turkish society. Mardin, for instance, argued that the groups who are unassim­
ilated into the modernist center and hence alienated by the Kemalist “cultural revolution” 
probably tended to support the NSP more than other groups in society: Because of the 
anti-capitalist rhetoric of the NSP and its emphasis on populist social justice, it is suggest­
ed that it aimed to draw support from the “men of the bazaar”, i.e., Turkish provincial
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craft groups, known as “E snaf’^ '’**^ Although there is no firm evidence of “E snaf’ sup­
port of the NSP, the relative strength of the NSP in Turkish provincial towns is consid­
ered to be the indication of such a link^'’'^  ^This may explain the reason for the NSP's rel­
atively powerful position in not the most underveloped areas but in relatively less 
developed areas of Turkey, particularly in the conservative segment of the provincial 
towns^^”\
According to Ozbudun, the decline of the socio-economic mobility of the “AnatoliaiT 
petty bourgeoisie” found its voice in the anti-Western, anti-big business, anti capitalist 
and anti-socialist stance of the NSPP‘\  Yet, if the NSP indeed was the party of the small 
merchants and artisans, it would be more appropriate to see this support more as the re­
flection of the Islamic conservatism of those groups^^^^ rather than a mere “reflection of 
the association between social mobility and political participation”P·^  ^ For, it is difficult to 
forge a rational link between the NSP's plea for the establishment of heavy industry and 
the total abolishment of interest and the artisan-shopkeepers’ support for it under the pro­
tectionist economic policies followed in the late 1960s, which provided the industrialists 
with cheap credit resources under low rate of inflation and secuied them from outside 
competition. Such a link is more plausible in competitive market economies where high 
inflation and high interest rates on credits cause great difficulties for the small industrial­
ists and merchants.
III. Social Characteristics of the NSP-PP Parliamentary Leadership
Despite the alleged relationship between the NSP and the small bourgeoisie, this 
was not reflected in the occupational breakdown of the NSP parliamentarian candidates. 
Taking Toprak’s figures as a basis for comparison with the PP, one finds that the main 
difference between the NSP parliamentary candidates in 1973 election and those of the PP 
in 1987 election is the sharp increase in the number of those classified under “Free Pro­
fessions” category which rose from 155 (33.7 %) in 1973 to 226 (50.2 %) in 1987. Yet, 
in both elections those who belonged to free professions outnumbered the members of 
“Goverment service” (19.2 %; 17.7 %) and of “Industry and commerce” (21.2 %; 13.3 
%) respectively, as seen in Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1: Professions of NSP Candidates, 1973 Election
P r o f e s s i o n N u m b e r P e r c e n ta g e  %
Free Professions 155 33.7
Engineers 64 14.2
L'lwyers 31 6.8
Exonomisis 21 4 .6
AccounlanlS'Financial Consullanis 10 1.8
Technicians 17 3.7
Doclor-Phamiacisis 12 2 .6
Government Sci'vice 87 19.2
Teiiclicis 40 8.8
■ Relircd Officers 28 6 .2
Burcauemts 19 4 .2
Industry and Commerce 96 2 1 .2
Farmers 20 4 .4
Clerics 13 2.8
Trade Unionisis 10 1.8
Other 69 15.3
S o u r c e :  B in ii i iz  T o p ra k , Islam and Political Development in Turkey (L e id e n  : E .J .B r ill , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 1 0 6 .
Table 2: Professions of PP Candidates, 1987 Election
P r o f e s s i o n N u m b e r P e r c e n ta g e  %
Free Professions 226 50 .2
Eiiginecrs 72 16.0
Liiwycrs 40 8.8
Economists 17 3.7
Accounlanls-Financial Consultants 22 4 .8
Teclinicians 10 2 .2
Doctor-Pharmacists 31 6 .8
Arcliitccts 5 1.1
vSh(X)pkeepers-Artisans 9 2 .0
Contractors 13 2 .8
Journalists 7 1.5
Government Sei*vice 80 17.7
TCiXlicis 48 10.6
Retired Officers 12 2 .6
Burcauciats 20 4 .4
Industry and Commerce 60 13.3
Fanners 10 2 .2
Clerics 11 2 .4
Trade Unionists 3 0 .6
Other 58 12.8
C o m p ile d  from  ; Resmi Gazele, 22 K a sım  1 9 8 7 , I’azar, S a y ı ; I9 6 d 2 .
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Like the NSP, F’P too,— tliougli the proportion of religious functionaries is not too 
high (2.4%) compared to other categories, has many candidates with a religious back­
ground, e.g., theologians among teachers being more than 56,2 percent. While the pro­
portion of government officials (19.2; 17.7) remained more or less the same, that of the 
business and commerce dropped more than one third (21.2; 13.3). In tenns of education, 
a continuum between the NSP and PP can be observed. While almost two thirds (65.2 
per cent) of NSP parliamentarians in 1973 were university graduates^’·^  ^ this figure was 
more or less the same (62.4 percent) in the PP's parliamentaiy candidates in 1987 (calcu­
lated from Resmi Gazete, 22 Kasım 1987, Pazar).
Tlıe professional and educational characteristics of the parliamentaidans or parlia­
mentary candidates of the NSP-PP line point to the fact that
'XThcy)... nrc, on (he whole, well eduenied, proi'essionnlly .successTuI, presumably of middle 
or upper-middle elass income, and relatively young. They do no( fit (he image of (he stereo- 
lype religious fanatic. Neither do they fit the category of men who have been adversely af­
fected by nKKİerni/atiiMi and turned to religion as a means of registering their disconlcnr^^'^l
IV. Characteristics of the NSP-PP Voters
Alongside the social background of the parliamentary leadership of the NSP and 
PP, the characteristics of the voters of those parties need to be analyzied, though within a 
tentative framework due to the absence of sufficient survey data, which makes it difficult 
to reach firm conclusions in this regard. According to a survey conducted by the daily 
Milliyet prior to the 1973 elections, the NSP was supported mainly due to its ideological 
orientation which was overtly religious. The NSP was the “ least preferable party“ among 
the majority of the young people (21-30 categoiy)^^'’^
According to a puplic opinion polls conducted in 1989, the age profile of the PP 
seems to have changed compared to the NSP. Today, unlike the NSP, the PP is not the 
“ least preferable party” among the youth. As Table 4 clearly shows, 13.6 per cent of 
those who are in the category of 21-24 age identified themselves with spiritualist-Islamist 
tendencies, an ideological category most prone to the PP. The reason for voting for the 
PP, however, has remained the same given the fact tliat the majority of those who consid­
ered themselves either spiritualist-lslamist or traditionalist-conservative preferred to cast 
their votes for the PP. (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Voter Types By Age
AGE
Ccnlcrisl-
Lilx r^al
vSocial
EXim(x:ral
Tradilionalisl-
Consci-valive
Spirilualisl-
Islamist
21-24 11.5 22.3 12.1 13.6
2.5-34 25.1 29.5 27.9 28.2
35-44 31.9 25.9 20.0 14.5
45-.54 12.6 13.7 19.4 24.5
55 and above 18.8 8.6 20.6 19.1
1 ()().() 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: PROFİL TÜRKİYE 1989: Değerler, Tulumlar, Davranışlar, (Turkey 1989; Value,s, Auiludes, Bc- 
haviour,s), PJAR-,S1AR, p. 132.
Table 4: 77ıe Voting Preferences By Different Voter Types
Centerist-
Lilx r^al
Social
Dem(x:i*at
Traditionalist-
Consciwative
Spiritualist-
Islamist
Mollierland Paily 2 5 .1 6.5 18.2 6.4
True Pad) Parly 23.6 9.4 13.3 25.5
Social Deiiiocralic Populist Parly 19.4 42.4 2.4 8.2
Dcm(x:ralic Left Parly 14.7 29.5 8.5 8.2
Prosperity Parly 3.1 — 24.2 34.5
Nationalist Work Party 2.1 2.2 10.3 4.5
Reformist Dem(x:ratic Pai1y 0.5 — 6.7 0.9
Don’t know 9.9 7.9 12.1 8.2
No answer 1.6 2.2 4.2 3.6
S o u r c e :  P R O F iL  T Ü R K İ Y E  1989: D e ğ e r le r  T u tu m la r , D a v ra n ış la r , (T u rk ey  19 8 9 : V a lu e s , A llitu c le s , B e h a v io u r s ) ,  
P I A R -S I A R , p . 1 3 0 .
It should be noted that there is not much difference between traditionalist- 
coiLservatives and spiritualist Islamists in terms of electoral behaviour.
The religious character of the NSP and PP voter has been confirmed by the present 
secretary-general of the PP, Oguzhan Asulturk, as follows;
“Our .support base is compo.sed generally of people who are committed to their moral and 
spiritual values. They can not be described as the “theocratisi (dinci) .section”. Tho.se who 
cast their votes for us belong to lower and lower-middle income people aspiring for both the 
spiritual and material development of Turkey. Almost all of them want their beliefs to be 
respected. They are practicing Muslims. But, lho.se who vole for us are not confined to that
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scclion. For example, in 1987 elections, we look votes both from the left and the right... 
This is why, our economic views address such sections of .society as workers, civil .servants, 
artisans, farmers and the retired, who are badly affected from the present economic policies
(77)
Despite Asilturk’s emphasis that the PP has managed to get votes from wage earn­
ers, it is not possible to substantiate this observation given the absence of survey data.
V. Voting Profile of the NSP-PP Line
As to the characteristics of the NSP and PP vote, one can trace its evolution in the 
general elections of 1973 and 1977, respectively, with special reference to its geographi­
cal profile. The NSP got 11.8 per cent of all the votes cast and sent 48 deputies to tlie Na­
tional Assembly in 1973 election. It has received the highest percentage of its votes from 
the relatively less developed administrative districts of the country, most of which are lo­
cated in the Eastern Anatolian region, as seen in Table 5, and have low levels of urbaniza­
tion. Thus, one can conclude that the NSP’s strength was greater in the less developed 
and less urbanized districts of Turkey
Table 5: T he Ten A d n iin is iro iiv e  D is tr ic is  \477// ihe H ig h es t P e rc e n ta g e  o f  N S P  V o te s  in 1 9 7 3  E lec tio n
AdrninivStratsve D istrict
Per cent of 
Votes R eceived %
Region wSiere the 
D istrict is Located
1. Er/,umm 29.5 East Anatolia
2. Elazığ 27.8 East Anatolia
3. Kaliraman jMaraş 26.7 East Anatolia
4. Sivas 25.7 Central Anatolia
5. Bingöl 25.5 East Anatolia
6. Gümüşhane 24.9 East Anatolia
7. Adıyaman 22.1 East Anatolia
8. Rize 21.9 Black Anatolia
9. Çorum 21.7 Central Anatolia
10. Yozgat 21.5 Central Anatolia
Source: Biiinaz Toprak: I.slam and Polilical Dcvclopmenl in Turkey (Leiden: E.J, Brill, 1981), p. 115.
— 84—
As clearly seen in Table 5, the NSP succeeded most in the Eastern Anatolia, while 
faired poorly in the economically well-developed regions compared to its national average.
In the three largest cities, namely Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the NSP again per- 
pormed rather poorly. The party’s average percentage of votes in these three metropolitan 
centers was 8. The party’s relative failure in the cities of the more developed regions 
points to the fact that it could not appeal to wage-earners and urban professionals^'’”^
Needless to say, the relationship betveen the NSP vote and the indices of socio­
economic development was negative. Yet, it is not clear what accounts for the relative 
strength of the NSP in the less developed eastern regions. According to Toprak, the 
NSP’s appeal in these regions can be explained by its reproduction of traditional social 
and economic relations!iips^'"\
The NSP’s voting profile experienced significant changes in the 1977 election. It 
has increased its votes 4.147 and got 1.269.918, which corresponded to 3.2 percent de­
cline in its share of total vote: 8.4 %. Yet, its number of representatives sent to the As­
sembly decreased by half: 24. At the sametime, the distribution of its votes marked that it 
become outrightly a regional party. While the NSP underwent losses in western and cen­
tral Turkey and in the Black Sea region’""^  it polled the highest percentage of its votes 
from administrative districts of the Eastern Anatolia, the least developed region in the 
country, as .seen in Table T. The negative relationship between urbanization and the 
NSP’s electoral strength continued to hold true in the 1977 election^''^\
I ’a b le  6: T he Ten A d m in ix iro live  D is ir ir is  w ith  the ¡ lig liex l P e rc e n la g e  o f  N S P  V o tes, 1 9 7 7  E lec tio n
A d n ıîıiîstra iiv e  D istrict
Per cent of 
Votes R eceived %
R egion w here the 
D istrict is Located
Bingöl 25.4 East Anatolia
Bitlis 27.3 East Anatolia
Malatya 20.4 East Anatolia
Mardin 23.2 East Anatolia
Siirt 22.0 East Anatolia
Van 20.5 East Anatolia
Adıyaman 19.2 East Anatolia
Urla 19.5 East Anatolia
Hakkari 18.5 East Anatolia
Konya■ 19.8 Central Anatolia
Source: Binnaz Topiak: Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden; E.J, Brill, 1981), p. 120.
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In spite of tlie fact that the NSP faired poorly in 1977 elections, it contiuned to be 
the third most strongest party in the Assembly. The NSP’s regional character showed that 
the Party’s electoral strength is not so decisive as to shape the contours of Turkish poli­
tics. Its lower performance in the areas where Alevi-sunni cleavage is important caused 
by the politicisation of the sectarian cleavage by the NAP, which was the main beneficiary 
of the Sunni votes in these regions, which went to the NSP in 1973 election. In short,
“llie NSP wa.s not able to  override llic .secloral, cla.s.s, elhnic, .sectarian and religious differ­
ences and forge a unitied movement with national appeal. Its electoral support, therefore, 
was confined to the relatively old, Sunni, provincial town electorate, largely concentrated in 
the eastern and central regions of AnatoIia” *^^‘*l
Following the re-transition to competitive politics in 1983 after the political restruc­
turing under the military rule (1980-1983), the first general election was held with the 
participation of only three party which was allowed by the National Security Council to 
compete in the election. The FT alongside the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrat 
Parti, SDP) and the TPP could not participate in the elections due to the political restraints 
imposed by the National Security Council comprising the members of the junta who made 
the coup of September 12, 1980. The PP competed in the 1984 local elections and got 
4.4 per cent of the total vote. Its former voters had been coopted by the ruling MP. Yet, 
the PP gradually increa.sed its votes. In the early general election of November 29, 1987, 
the MP sent 292 repre.sentatives to the Assembly thanks to the advantages stemming from 
the Election Law, which favored the big parties. While the SDP and the TPP sent 99 and 
59 representatives to the Assembly, respectively, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik 
Sol Parti, DLP) and the PP could not exceed the 10 per cent national barrage and re­
mained outside the Parliament together with some other minor parties. In this election, the 
PP was able to get back a large part of its fonner votes which had gone to the MP and re­
ceived 7.1 per cent of the total vote^ *·^ .^ According to one calculation, if the pre-1980 Elec­
tion Law had been in effect in that election, the PP could have sent 21 representatives to
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tlie Assemb!y^*'^’\  The fact that the PP and the DLP have exceeded the regional baixage in 
many districts and yet could not surpass the national one is a clear indication of the disrup­
tion of “representation” in favor of “stability”, which led to the emergence of an “uncon­
trolled political power”, causal by the elation  system^*’^ \
Although the PP could not send any representative to the Assembly in 1987 election 
due to the 10 per cent national barrage, it exceeded that barrage in 20 provinces (Table 8), 
and it ranked the second party in four provinces: Diyarbakır, Siirt, Bitlis and Van.
Table 7: The Twenty Administrative Districts where the PP Exceeded the
National Barrage, 1987 Election
A d m  î n 3 s t r a t i V e I) i s t r i c t Per cent o f Vote.s Region w here the
Received % D istrict is Located
Diyarbakır 24..S vSoulli-East Anatolia
vSiirl 24.0 Soulh-Easl Anatolia
Bingöl 22.1 Easlern Anatolia
Billis 21.1 Eastern Anatolia
Elazığ 17.6 Easiern Anatolia
Viin 17.3 Easlern Anatolia
Mardin 16.9 vSoulh-EasI Anatolia
Konya 15.0 Ccniral Anatolia
Rize 14.2 Nodlieast Black vSea
Ağrı 14.0 Eastern Anatolia
K. Maraş 13.7 Eastern Anatolia
Muş 13.6 vSouth-East Anatolia
Gümüşhane 13.2 Easlern Anatolia
K(xacli 13.1 Miumaia
Giresun 12.6 Black Sea
vSivas 11.9 Eastern Anatolia
Şanlıuıia 11.6 South-East Anatolia
Adıyaman 11.4 Easlern Anatolia
Trabzon 11.1 Black Sea
Ncvşeliir 10.6 Central Anatolia
Source: R e sm i G a z e te , 9 Andık 1987.
As Table 7 clearly indicates, the PP, like the NSP, is still a regional party, which is 
relatively powerful in the less developed regions of Eastern and South-East Anatolia. The 
Central Anatolia and the Northeast Black Sea regions are other areas where the PP drew 
its votes. It seems that the PP have important difficulties in appealing to the socially-
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differentiated sections of society, which was clearly reflected in its relatively poor electo­
ral performance in the three big cities, namely Istanbul (6.8 %), Ankara (4.2 %) and 
Izmir (2.2 %) in 1987 election.
The PP increased its votes to 9.8 percent of the total vote in the 1989 local election 
and gained the municipalities in five provincies. This may be an indication of its po­
tential power ba.se to exceed the national barrage in the next general election. Paiticularly 
in the Eastern and South-FZast regions, the PP appears to be the major contender for the 
votes, given the unpopularity of other parties including the “leftist ones”*^'’^  ^in those areas 
because of their “conservative” stand regarding the so-called “Kurdish question”. On the 
other hand, if it can benefit from the Islamization tendencies among the former nationalist 
youth, it may, once again, gain the Sunni votes in the Alevi-populated areas^ *^ *^ .^
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CONCLUSION
During the one party era, Islamic politics was confined to the tarikat activities, 
which were forced to remain underground. Accordingly, the form and content of Islamic 
politics could not go beyond the sporadic and abortive uprisings of various sufi orders. 
When the centralist elites introduced “democracy from above”, the nascent Islamic forma­
tions lent their support to the anti-bureaucratic and periphery-oriented DP. From then on, 
they constituted the mainstay of the political support base of the populist, center-right par­
ties. In the 1960s, the JP garnered the religious vote. Thus, first against the militant secu­
larism of the RPP, and later against the leftism of the same party, the religious vote be­
came the “reserve force” of the rightist parties. In the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to 
the ideological proliferation of the 1960s, the first independent Islamic political Party, the 
National Order Party (NOP) was established by Necmettin Erbakan and his associates. 
The NOP played a prime role in the repoliticisation of Islam in Turkey. It accelerated the 
participation of the Muslims in the political process^'l In this regared, it contributed to the 
resolution of the “participation crisis”*^ l
Following the closing down of the NOP, the National Salvation Party was found­
ed. The NSP emerged as the representative of the groups adversely affected by the rapid 
course of the modernization process, namely, the small bourgeoisie, as a reaction to the 
‘priviliged’ position of the big bourgeoisie in exploiting economic resources. It occupied 
a distinct place among the peripheral forces against the center. It was largely based on cul­
tural cleavages. Y e t, it had a functional dimension as well. The party appeared to be an 
Islamic protest movement representing the grievances of those .sections of society which 
felt insecure against the socio-economic changes Turkey experienced in the late 1960s and 
1970s.
The claim that “the center-periphery” cleavage is being replaced by the functional 
cleavage as the new basis of the party system*^' is wanting on the empirical grounds. In a 
society in which even the ideological cleavages of the left and right assumed a cultural di­
mension ratlier than being a mere reflection of functional cleavages, it is difficult to talk of 
the primacy of tho.se cleavages. Although the NSP’s programme included many socio­
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economic suggestions, this was more the resuit of an ideological stance determined by 
negative attitude against westernization and the yearn for the glorious past than being tlie 
articulation of mere economic grievances. In fact, the overlapping of the cleavages in the 
NSP-PP iine points to the fact that functional cleavages were articulated in accordance 
with the requirements of de-westernisation as the NSP perceived it. In the same vein, the 
emphasis on the problems and demands of the popular sector by the PP in the 1980s can 
be connected to the fact that this sector has been the most adversely affected group from 
the new economic policies pursued under the military rule and the following Özal gover- 
ments. Yet, the basic orientation of the PP along ideological lines has remained the same. 
This indicates tiiat the changing dimension of the NSP-PP line is the reflection of the 
changing nature of the functional cleavages. Similarly, the continuities can be attested to 
their involvement in the cultural-ideological cleavages. All in all, one can conclude that
“(lie specific clianicterislics of Islamic politics in Turkey are closely bound up witli (he 
siaie-dominaiK naiure of Turkish polilical culture and society. More specifically......chang­
es in (he nature of Islamic politics and movements, (heir organization, aims and strategies, 
have been in large part shaped by (he changing structure and ideology of (he state and (he 
centralist elites" '^’\
Accordingly, one can discern some basic features of the NSP-PP line as follows:
•  The political identity of the parties of the National Outlook has not been put for­
ward in clear lines. This is mainly due to the legal constrainsts over the freedom of ex­
pression and organizations which prohibit the politicisation of religion. This has forced 
the NSP-PP to forge a .symbolic dialog with its followers and pursue a dual approach in a 
number of issues such as secularism and Ataturkism. This state of affairs also explains 
the avoidance of radicalism by the NSP-PP line, which is the legacy of the Islamic move­
ment that has been shaped by its experiences evolved in the context of the Kemalist re­
structurization of the Republic. The avoidance of radicalism both at the level of rhetoric 
and to some extent, of action overlaps with the pro-state posture of the sufi orders that 
have considered the cooperation with rightist political parties as tlie main strategy to en­
large their “ living space”('^ \ Yet, the challenge of the strenghtening radical Islam in line
-96-
with the overall trend in the Muslim World has remained unmet by the leadership of the 
NSP-PP line^ *’l. Although the increasingly worsening economic conditions coupled with 
the increasing visibility of Islam ensured self-confidence on the side of the PP, it could 
not radicalize its political discourse.
•  The Islamic values have a central place in the ideology of the National Outlook. 
Yet, there is an extreme caution regarding the justification of those values on secular 
grounds. Despite the abolishment of the article 163 of the Penal Code, there is no tenden­
cy toward assuming an overtly Islamist political identity due to the lingering uncertainities 
in the laws concerned.
m i  he National Outlook is the specific articulation of Islam by Necmettin Erbakan 
and other leaders of the party. It does not have a doctrinal character. Its populistic and 
pragmatic dimension is more dominant. Therefore, it does not go much beyond the reac­
tion to the current qucstions^’l  In this respect, one can discern its unfolding over time 
with more clarity.
•  The NSP’s praginatic attitude might, in the long run, turn it into a sort of “Mus­
lim Democrat Party.” It has been claimed that “the NSP could have become a ‘practically 
secular’ party, retaining its religious rhetoric, on the one hand, and trying to cope with 
daily secular political life on the o t h e r . Y e t ,  this prediction ignores the fact that the 
NSP-PP line derives its legitimacy from Islam, not the political system in which it oper­
ates. In this regard, contrary to the Christian Democrat Parties in Europe, which identify 
themselves with the system, the NSP-PP line tends to be more radical, in the final analy­
sis, with its anti-systemic characteri^l
•  In terms of its electoral performance, the PP is not too different from the NSP. It 
is, like the NSP, powerful in the East and South-East Anatolia. In fact, its role in the 
Kurdish question, in this regard, may appear to be crucial given the relatively weak politi­
cal support of the other parties in the region. It seems that it has stabilized its votes around 
more or less 10 per cent. It has difficulty in securing support in the big cities, like the 
NSP. The most important power base of the NSP-PP line is the provincial towns where 
the Islamic movements find a ripe ground to flourish.
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Yet, the PP has to undertake a number of predicaments it inherited from the NSP; 
1) The main predicament of the PP is that it can not transform itself along the line of mass 
paities. In ideological terms, it presents the image of a rigid party. It does not have a well- 
articulated and sophisticated doctrine, though. This makes very difficult for the NSP-PP 
line to reach the non-religious masses. On top of that it can not transmit its message to a 
large section of the electorate because it is overlooked by the secular mass media. Thus, it 
is almost impossible for the PP to come into power through the democratic process^'”\  
Yet, becau.se the power is so central to the realization of, at least, partial gains, the NSP- 
PP line may participate in all sorts of coalition govennents. 2) Another important problem 
to be handled is the “ leadership oligarchy” in the NSP-PP line. Except the interim periods 
caused by the military interventions, the NSP and PP have been under the leadership of 
the same cadre. There has been no tradition of intra-party democracy in the NSP-PP line 
In fact, Necmettin Erbakan has come to be regarded as the “natural leader of the Isla­
mist movement in the democratic p l a t f o r m . T h i s ,  of cour.se, may adversely affect the 
electoral performance of the party, because it leads to the waning of dynamism in the low­
er ranks of the party due to their total exclusion from the decision making process within 
the party. 3) Last, but not the least, the PP has to formulate its ideology in a more com­
prehensive and coherent fashion such that it can present the public with a new social pro­
ject different from tho.se of capitalism and .socialism. The slogan that “Islam is the solu­
tion to all the problems of life” is not very meaningfull and appealling for non-religious 
masses. As an Islamist writer sympathetic to the PP ob.served, in order to avoid giving 
the impression that the PP has reached the natural limits of its electoral strength, the popu­
lar articulation of the concrete solutions suggested by the PP to economic problems needs 
to be given the characteristics of an alternative strategy of growth '^·^^
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